Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Utilitarianism and the Virtues', 'The Limits of Contingency' and 'Logicism, Some Considerations (PhD)'

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22 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
22462 We should speak the truth, but also preserve and pursue it [Foot]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / c. Axiom of Pairing II
18851 Pairing (with Extensionality) guarantees an infinity of sets, just from a single element [Rosen]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
13412 Obtaining numbers by abstraction is impossible - there are too many; only a rule could give them, in order [Benacerraf]
13413 We must explain how we know so many numbers, and recognise ones we haven't met before [Benacerraf]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / c. Priority of numbers
13411 If numbers are basically the cardinals (Frege-Russell view) you could know some numbers in isolation [Benacerraf]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
13415 An adequate account of a number must relate it to its series [Benacerraf]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
18852 A Meinongian principle might say that there is an object for any modest class of properties [Rosen]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
18849 Metaphysical necessity is absolute and universal; metaphysical possibility is very tolerant [Rosen]
18850 'Metaphysical' modality is the one that makes the necessity or contingency of laws of nature interesting [Rosen]
18858 Sets, universals and aggregates may be metaphysically necessary in one sense, but not another [Rosen]
18857 Standard Metaphysical Necessity: P holds wherever the actual form of the world holds [Rosen]
18856 Non-Standard Metaphysical Necessity: when ¬P is incompatible with the nature of things [Rosen]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
18848 Something may be necessary because of logic, but is that therefore a special sort of necessity? [Rosen]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 3. Combinatorial possibility
18855 Combinatorial theories of possibility assume the principles of combination don't change across worlds [Rosen]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
18853 A proposition is 'correctly' conceivable if an ominiscient being could conceive it [Rosen]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
22458 Consequentialists can hurt the innocent in order to prevent further wickedness [Foot]
22460 Why might we think that a state of affairs can be morally good or bad? [Foot]
22461 Good outcomes are not external guides to morality, but a part of virtuous actions [Foot]
22464 The idea of a good state of affairs has no role in the thought of Aristotle, Rawls or Scanlon [Foot]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
22463 Morality is seen as tacit legislation by the community [Foot]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 5. Rule Utilitarianism
22459 For consequentialism, it is irrational to follow a rule which in this instance ends badly [Foot]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / b. Best system theory
18854 The MRL view says laws are the theorems of the simplest and strongest account of the world [Rosen]