10 ideas
| 9354 | Why should necessities only be knowable a priori? That Hesperus is Phosporus is known empirically [Devitt] |
| 9353 | We explain away a priori knowledge, not as directly empirical, but as indirectly holistically empirical [Devitt] |
| 9356 | The idea of the a priori is so obscure that it won't explain anything [Devitt] |
| 19413 | If we know what is good or rational, our knowledge is extended, and our free will restricted [Leibniz] |
| 22465 | We see a moral distinction between doing and allowing to happen [Foot] |
| 22466 | We see a moral distinction between our aims and their foreseen consequences [Foot] |
| 22467 | Acts and omissions only matter if they concern doing something versus allowing it [Foot] |
| 22470 | A good moral system benefits its participants, and so demands reciprocity [Foot] |
| 22468 | Virtues can have aims, but good states of affairs are not among them [Foot] |
| 22469 | Some virtues imply rules, and others concern attachment [Foot] |