29 ideas
2352 | The job of the philosopher is to distinguish facts about the world from conventions [Putnam] |
2345 | Semantic notions do not occur in Tarski's definitions, but assessing their correctness involves translation [Putnam] |
2347 | Asserting the truth of an indexical statement is not the same as uttering the statement [Putnam] |
2349 | Realists believe truth is correspondence, independent of humans, is bivalent, and is unique [Putnam] |
2351 | Aristotle says an object (e.g. a lamp) has identity if its parts stay together when it is moved [Putnam] |
14305 | In the truth-functional account a burnt-up match was soluble because it never entered water [Carnap] |
2331 | Functionalism says robots and people are the same at one level of abstraction [Putnam] |
2348 | Is there just one computational state for each specific belief? [Putnam] |
2332 | Functionalism can't explain reference and truth, which are needed for logic [Putnam] |
2071 | If concepts have external meaning, computational states won't explain psychology [Putnam] |
2344 | If we are going to eliminate folk psychology, we must also eliminate folk logic [Putnam] |
2074 | Can we give a scientific, computational account of folk psychology? [Putnam] |
2343 | Reference may be different while mental representation is the same [Putnam] |
2346 | Meaning and translation (which are needed to define truth) both presuppose the notion of reference [Putnam] |
2354 | "Meaning is use" is not a definition of meaning [Putnam] |
2336 | Holism seems to make fixed definition more or less impossible [Putnam] |
2334 | Meaning holism tried to show that you can't get fixed meanings built out of observation terms [Putnam] |
2335 | Understanding a sentence involves background knowledge and can't be done in isolation [Putnam] |
2340 | We should separate how the reference of 'gold' is fixed from its conceptual content [Putnam] |
2341 | Like names, natural kind terms have their meaning fixed by extension and reference [Putnam] |
2339 | Aristotle implies that we have the complete concepts of a language in our heads, but we don't [Putnam] |
2338 | Reference (say to 'elms') is a social phenomenon which we can leave to experts [Putnam] |
22465 | We see a moral distinction between doing and allowing to happen [Foot] |
22466 | We see a moral distinction between our aims and their foreseen consequences [Foot] |
22467 | Acts and omissions only matter if they concern doing something versus allowing it [Foot] |
22470 | A good moral system benefits its participants, and so demands reciprocity [Foot] |
22468 | Virtues can have aims, but good states of affairs are not among them [Foot] |
22469 | Some virtues imply rules, and others concern attachment [Foot] |
2342 | "Water" is a natural kind term, but "H2O" is a description [Putnam] |