83 ideas
| 7846 | Nietzsche thinks philosophy makes us more profound, but not better [Nietzsche, by Ansell Pearson] |
| 20107 | How many mediocre thinkers are occupied with influential problems! [Nietzsche] |
| 2797 | As coherence expands its interrelations become steadily tighter, culminating only in necessary truth [Dancy,J] |
| 20352 | Nietzsche has a metaphysics, as well as perspectives - the ontology is the perspectives [Nietzsche, by Richardson] |
| 20379 | Reason is just another organic drive, developing late, and fighting for equality [Nietzsche] |
| 2768 | The correspondence theory also has the problem that two sets of propositions might fit the facts equally well [Dancy,J] |
| 2765 | Rescher says that if coherence requires mutual entailment, this leads to massive logical redundancy [Dancy,J] |
| 2769 | If one theory is held to be true, all the other theories appear false, because they can't be added to the true one [Dancy,J] |
| 2766 | Even with a tight account of coherence, there is always the possibility of more than one set of coherent propositions [Dancy,J] |
| 2781 | Realism says that most perceived objects exist, and have some of their perceived properties [Dancy,J] |
| 20123 | First see nature as non-human, then fit ourselves into this view of nature [Nietzsche] |
| 20105 | Storms are wonderful expressions of free powers! [Nietzsche] |
| 20376 | We begin with concepts of kinds, from individuals; but that is not the essence of individuals [Nietzsche] |
| 2745 | A pupil who lacks confidence may clearly know something but not be certain of it [Dancy,J] |
| 2755 | If senses are fallible, then being open to correction is an epistemological virtue [Dancy,J] |
| 5677 | Naïve direct realists hold that objects retain all of their properties when unperceived [Dancy,J] |
| 5678 | Scientific direct realism says we know some properties of objects directly [Dancy,J] |
| 5681 | Maybe we are forced from direct into indirect realism by the need to explain perceptual error [Dancy,J] |
| 5682 | Internal realism holds that we perceive physical objects via mental objects [Dancy,J] |
| 5683 | Indirect realism depends on introspection, the time-lag, illusions, and neuroscience [Dancy,J, by PG] |
| 2778 | Phenomenalism includes possible experiences, but idealism only refers to actual experiences [Dancy,J] |
| 5684 | Eliminative idealists say there are no objects; reductive idealists say objects exist as complex experiences [Dancy,J] |
| 2777 | Extreme solipsism only concerns current experience, but it might include past and future [Dancy,J] |
| 2794 | Knowing that a cow is not a horse seems to be a synthetic a priori truth [Dancy,J] |
| 2780 | Perception is either direct realism, indirect realism, or phenomenalism [Dancy,J] |
| 5679 | We can't grasp the separation of quality types, or what a primary-quality world would be like [Dancy,J] |
| 5680 | For direct realists the secondary and primary qualities seem equally direct [Dancy,J] |
| 2782 | We can be looking at distant stars which no longer actually exist [Dancy,J] |
| 2775 | It is not clear from the nature of sense data whether we should accept them as facts [Dancy,J] |
| 2784 | Appearances don't guarantee reality, unless the appearance is actually caused by the reality [Dancy,J] |
| 2785 | Perceptual beliefs may be directly caused, but generalisations can't be [Dancy,J] |
| 2788 | If perception and memory are indirect, then two things stand between mind and reality [Dancy,J] |
| 2787 | Memories aren't directly about the past, because time-lags and illusions suggest representation [Dancy,J] |
| 2791 | Phenomenalism about memory denies the past, or reduces it to present experience [Dancy,J] |
| 2790 | I can remember plans about the future, and images aren't essential (2+3=5) [Dancy,J] |
| 2754 | Foundations are justified by non-beliefs, or circularly, or they need no justification [Dancy,J] |
| 2749 | For internalists we must actually know that the fact caused the belief [Dancy,J] |
| 2770 | Internalists tend to favour coherent justification, but not the coherence theory of truth [Dancy,J] |
| 2752 | Foundationalism requires inferential and non-inferential justification [Dancy,J] |
| 2771 | Foundationalists must accept not only the basic beliefs, but also rules of inference for further progress [Dancy,J] |
| 2756 | If basic beliefs can be false, falsehood in non-basic beliefs might by a symptom [Dancy,J] |
| 2753 | Beliefs can only be infallible by having almost no content [Dancy,J] |
| 2773 | Coherentism gives a possible justification of induction, and opposes scepticism [Dancy,J] |
| 2779 | Idealists must be coherentists, but coherentists needn't be idealists [Dancy,J] |
| 2786 | For coherentists justification and truth are not radically different things [Dancy,J] |
| 2767 | If it is empirical propositions which have to be coherent, this eliminates coherent fiction [Dancy,J] |
| 2776 | Externalism could even make belief unnecessary (e.g. in animals) [Dancy,J] |
| 2746 | How can a causal theory of justification show that all men die? [Dancy,J] |
| 2747 | Causal theories don't allow for errors in justification [Dancy,J] |
| 2772 | Coherentism moves us towards a more social, shared view of knowledge [Dancy,J] |
| 2743 | What is the point of arguing against knowledge, if being right undermines your own argument? [Dancy,J] |
| 2751 | Probabilities can only be assessed relative to some evidence [Dancy,J] |
| 2757 | The argument from analogy rests on one instance alone [Dancy,J] |
| 2758 | You can't separate mind and behaviour, as the analogy argument attempts [Dancy,J] |
| 2744 | Verificationism (the 'verification principle') is an earlier form of anti-realism [Dancy,J] |
| 2760 | Logical positivism implies foundationalism, by dividing weak from strong verifications [Dancy,J] |
| 2761 | If the meanings of sentences depend on other sentences, how did we learn language? [Dancy,J] |
| 2763 | There is an indeterminacy in juggling apparent meanings against probable beliefs [Dancy,J] |
| 2762 | Charity makes native beliefs largely true, and Humanity makes them similar to ours [Dancy,J] |
| 22501 | Nietzsche classified actions by the nature of the agent, not the nature of the act [Nietzsche, by Foot] |
| 22500 | Nietzsche failed to see that moral actions can be voluntary without free will [Foot on Nietzsche] |
| 22445 | Morality shows murder is wrong, but not what counts as a murder [Foot] |
| 22444 | A moral system must deal with the dangers and benefits of life [Foot] |
| 20128 | Each person has a fixed constitution, which makes them a particular type of person [Nietzsche, by Leiter] |
| 22503 | Nietzsche could only revalue human values for a different species [Nietzsche, by Foot] |
| 8041 | The superman is a monstrous oddity, not a serious idea [MacIntyre on Nietzsche] |
| 20135 | Nietzsche's higher type of man is much more important than the idealised 'superman' [Nietzsche, by Leiter] |
| 20353 | The 'will to power' is basically applied to drives and forces, not to people [Nietzsche, by Richardson] |
| 22447 | Saying something 'just is' right or wrong creates an illusion of fact and objectivity [Foot] |
| 20113 | Friendly chats undermine my philosophy; wanting to be right at the expense of love is folly [Nietzsche] |
| 22475 | Moral generalisation is wrong, because we should evaluate individual acts [Nietzsche, by Foot] |
| 22476 | Nietzsche thought our psychology means there can't be universal human virtues [Nietzsche, by Foot] |
| 22448 | We sometimes just use the word 'should' to impose a rule of conduct on someone [Foot] |
| 20104 | Nietzsche tried to lead a thought-provoking life [Safranski on Nietzsche] |
| 7847 | Initially nihilism was cosmic, but later Nietzsche saw it as a cultural matter [Nietzsche, by Ansell Pearson] |
| 9782 | Nietzsche urges that nihilism be active, and will nothing itself [Nietzsche, by Zizek] |
| 20102 | Flight from boredom leads to art [Nietzsche] |
| 20106 | Nietzsche was fascinated by a will that can turn against itself [Nietzsche, by Safranski] |
| 20124 | Reliving life countless times - this gives the value back to life which religion took away [Nietzsche] |
| 20367 | Individual development is more important than the state, but a community is necessary [Nietzsche] |
| 20371 | Nietzsche thinks we should join a society, in order to criticise, heal and renew it [Nietzsche, by Richardson] |
| 20108 | Every culture loses its identity and power if it lacks a major myth [Nietzsche] |
| 22446 | In the case of something lacking independence, calling it a human being is a matter of choice [Foot] |