Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Natural Goodness', 'Epistemic Injustice' and 'On 'Physics''

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23 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
22496 Wisdom only implies the knowledge achievable in any normal lifetime [Foot]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 6. Successive Things
16695 Successive entities are in flux, flowing in existence, with different parts at different times [Oresme]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
23551 It is necessary for a belief that it be held for a length of time [Fricker,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 1. Epistemic virtues
23558 Offering knowledge needs accuracy and sincerity; receiving it needs testimonial justice [Fricker,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 7. Testimony
23553 Testimonial judgement is not logical, but produces reasons and motivations [Fricker,M]
23550 Burge says we are normally a priori entitled to believe testimony [Fricker,M]
23552 We assess testimonial probabilities by the speaker, the listener, the facts, and the circumstances [Fricker,M]
23555 Assessing credibility involves the impact of both the speaker's and the listener's social identity [Fricker,M]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
23554 Judgements can be unreflective and non-inferential, yet rational, by being sensitive to experience [Fricker,M]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
23694 All criterions of practical rationality derive from goodness of will [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
23557 To judge agents in remote times and cultures we need a moral resentment weaker than blame [Fricker,M]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
23686 Moral reason is not just neutral, because morality is part of the standard of rationality [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
23693 Practical rationality must weigh both what is morally and what is non-morally required [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
23687 Moral virtues arise from human nature, as part of what makes us good human beings [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / k. Ethics from nature
22492 Virtues are as necessary to humans as stings are to bees [Foot]
22493 Sterility is a human defect, but the choice to be childless is not [Foot]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
22491 Moral evaluations are not separate from facts, but concern particular facts about functioning [Foot]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
22497 Deep happiness usually comes from the basic things in life [Foot]
22498 Happiness is enjoying the pursuit and attainment of right ends [Foot]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
23695 Good actions can never be justified by the good they brings to their agent [Foot]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 5. Free Rider
22499 We all know that just pretending to be someone's friend is not the good life [Foot]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
22495 Someone is a good person because of their rational will, not their body or memory [Foot]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 7. Existential Action
22502 Refraining from murder is not made good by authenticity or self-fulfilment [Foot]