Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Natural Goodness', 'works' and 'Epistemology'

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27 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
22496 Wisdom only implies the knowledge achievable in any normal lifetime [Foot]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
13445 Descartes showed a one-one order-preserving match between points on a line and the real numbers [Descartes, by Hart,WD]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
16774 Descartes thinks distinguishing substances from aggregates is pointless [Descartes, by Pasnau]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
7301 The phenomenalist says that to be is to be perceivable [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
7302 Linguistic phenomenalism says we can eliminate talk of physical objects [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
7303 If we lack enough sense-data, are we to say that parts of reality are 'indeterminate'? [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
7299 Primary qualities can be described mathematically, unlike secondary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
7300 An object cannot remain an object without its primary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
7400 Descartes said images can refer to objects without resembling them (as words do) [Descartes, by Tuck]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
7297 My justifications might be very coherent, but totally unconnected to the world [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
4310 We have inner awareness of our freedom [Descartes]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
6553 Descartes discussed the interaction problem, and compared it with gravity [Descartes, by Lycan]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
23694 All criterions of practical rationality derive from goodness of will [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
23686 Moral reason is not just neutral, because morality is part of the standard of rationality [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
23693 Practical rationality must weigh both what is morally and what is non-morally required [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
23687 Moral virtues arise from human nature, as part of what makes us good human beings [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / k. Ethics from nature
22492 Virtues are as necessary to humans as stings are to bees [Foot]
22493 Sterility is a human defect, but the choice to be childless is not [Foot]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
22491 Moral evaluations are not separate from facts, but concern particular facts about functioning [Foot]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
22497 Deep happiness usually comes from the basic things in life [Foot]
22498 Happiness is enjoying the pursuit and attainment of right ends [Foot]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
23695 Good actions can never be justified by the good they brings to their agent [Foot]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 5. Free Rider
22499 We all know that just pretending to be someone's friend is not the good life [Foot]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
22495 Someone is a good person because of their rational will, not their body or memory [Foot]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 7. Existential Action
22502 Refraining from murder is not made good by authenticity or self-fulfilment [Foot]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
19676 Nature is devoid of thought [Descartes, by Meillassoux]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / c. Matter as extension
6518 Matter can't just be Descartes's geometry, because a filler of the spaces is needed [Robinson,H on Descartes]