15 ideas
11181 | Aristotelian essentialism involves a 'natural' or 'causal' interpretation of modal operators [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11184 | Aristotelian essentialism is about shared properties, individuating essentialism about distinctive properties [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11180 | Essentialist sentences are not theorems of modal logic, and can even be false [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11186 | 'Essentially' won't replace 'necessarily' for vacuous properties like snub-nosed or self-identical [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11185 | 'Is essentially' has a different meaning from 'is necessarily', as they often cannot be substituted [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11182 | If essences are objects with only essential properties, they are elusive in possible worlds [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11183 | The use of possible worlds is to sort properties (not to individuate objects) [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11187 | In possible worlds, names are just neutral unvarying pegs for truths and predicates [Marcus (Barcan)] |
15788 | Syntax and semantics are indeterminate, and modern 'semantics' is a bogus subject [Quine, by Lycan] |
22445 | Morality shows murder is wrong, but not what counts as a murder [Foot] |
22444 | A moral system must deal with the dangers and benefits of life [Foot] |
22447 | Saying something 'just is' right or wrong creates an illusion of fact and objectivity [Foot] |
22448 | We sometimes just use the word 'should' to impose a rule of conduct on someone [Foot] |
22446 | In the case of something lacking independence, calling it a human being is a matter of choice [Foot] |
11189 | Dispositional essences are special, as if an object loses them they cease to exist [Marcus (Barcan)] |