Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Natural Goodness', 'Equality and Partiality' and 'The Concept of Mind'

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32 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
22496 Wisdom only implies the knowledge achievable in any normal lifetime [Foot]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
18005 Philosophy aims to become more disciplined about categories [Ryle]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / e. Dispositions as potential
14297 A dispositional property is not a state, but a liability to be in some state, given a condition [Ryle]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers
14300 No physical scientist now believes in an occult force-exerting agency [Ryle]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation
2622 Can one movement have a mental and physical cause? [Ryle]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
1353 Reporting on myself has the same problems as reporting on you [Ryle]
1354 We cannot introspect states of anger or panic [Ryle]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
2624 I cannot prepare myself for the next thought I am going to think [Ryle]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
2620 Dualism is a category mistake [Ryle]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
2388 Behaviour depends on desires as well as beliefs [Chalmers on Ryle]
3354 You can't explain mind as dispositions, if they aren't real [Benardete,JA on Ryle]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
2387 How can behaviour be the cause of behaviour? [Chalmers on Ryle]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
23694 All criterions of practical rationality derive from goodness of will [Foot]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / c. Omissions
6479 Noninterference requires justification as much as interference does [Nagel]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / a. Preconditions for ethics
6450 Morality must be motivating, and not because of pre-moral motives [Nagel]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
23686 Moral reason is not just neutral, because morality is part of the standard of rationality [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
23693 Practical rationality must weigh both what is morally and what is non-morally required [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
23687 Moral virtues arise from human nature, as part of what makes us good human beings [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / k. Ethics from nature
22493 Sterility is a human defect, but the choice to be childless is not [Foot]
22492 Virtues are as necessary to humans as stings are to bees [Foot]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
22491 Moral evaluations are not separate from facts, but concern particular facts about functioning [Foot]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
22497 Deep happiness usually comes from the basic things in life [Foot]
22498 Happiness is enjoying the pursuit and attainment of right ends [Foot]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
23695 Good actions can never be justified by the good they brings to their agent [Foot]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 5. Free Rider
22499 We all know that just pretending to be someone's friend is not the good life [Foot]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 6. Game Theory
6447 Game theory misses out the motivation arising from the impersonal standpoint [Nagel]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
22495 Someone is a good person because of their rational will, not their body or memory [Foot]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
6446 In ethics we abstract from our identity, but not from our humanity [Nagel]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
6477 I can only universalise a maxim if everyone else could also universalise it [Nagel]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 7. Existential Action
22502 Refraining from murder is not made good by authenticity or self-fulfilment [Foot]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / c. Liberal equality
6448 A legitimate system is one accepted as both impartial and reasonably partial [Nagel]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 2. Political equality
6478 Democracy is opposed to equality, if the poor are not a majority [Nagel]