Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Natural Goodness', 'Essays on Intellectual Powers 5: Abstraction' and 'Epistemology: contemporary introduction'

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46 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
22496 Wisdom only implies the knowledge achievable in any normal lifetime [Foot]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 5. Universals as Concepts
23651 Universals are not objects of sense and cannot be imagined - but can be conceived [Reid]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
23650 Only individuals exist [Reid]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
23649 No one thinks two sheets possess a single whiteness, but all agree they are both white [Reid]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
11874 Real identity admits of no degrees [Reid]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
2730 Because 'gold is malleable' is necessary does not mean that it is analytic [Audi,R]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs
2715 Beliefs are based on perception, memory, introspection or reason [Audi,R]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / e. Belief holism
2735 Could you have a single belief on its own? [Audi,R]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
2736 We can make certain of what we know, so knowing does not entail certainty [Audi,R]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
2721 If you gradually remove a book's sensory properties, what is left at the end? [Audi,R]
2722 Sense-data theory is indirect realism, but phenomenalism is direct irrealism [Audi,R]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
2728 The concepts needed for a priori thought may come from experience [Audi,R]
2727 Red and green being exclusive colours seems to be rationally graspable but not analytic [Audi,R]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
2717 How could I see a field and believe nothing regarding it? [Audi,R]
2716 To see something as a field, I obviously need the concept of a field [Audi,R]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
2719 Sense data imply representative realism, possibly only representing primary qualities [Audi,R]
2720 Sense-data (and the rival 'adverbial' theory) are to explain illusions and hallucinations [Audi,R]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
2718 Perception is first simple, then objectual (with concepts) and then propositional [Audi,R]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
2729 Virtually all rationalists assert that we can have knowledge of synthetic a priori truths [Audi,R]
2741 The principles of justification have to be a priori [Audi,R]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
2725 To remember something is to know it [Audi,R]
2724 I might remember someone I can't recall or image, by recognising them on meeting [Audi,R]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
2731 Justification is either unanchored (infinite or circular), or anchored (in knowledge or non-knowledge) [Audi,R]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
2739 Internalism about justification implies that there is a right to believe something [Audi,R]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
2732 Maths may be consistent with observations, but not coherent [Audi,R]
2733 It is very hard to show how much coherence is needed for justification [Audi,R]
2734 A consistent madman could have a very coherent belief system [Audi,R]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
2738 Consistent accurate prediction looks like knowledge without justified belief [Audi,R]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
2740 A reliability theory of knowledge seems to involve truth as correspondence [Audi,R]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
2737 'Reliable' is a very imprecise term, and may even mean 'justified' [Audi,R]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 4. Errors in Introspection
2726 We can be ignorant about ourselves, for example, our desires and motives [Audi,R]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
23652 We must first conceive things before we can consider them [Reid]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
23648 First we notice and name attributes ('abstracting'); then we notice that subjects share them ('generalising') [Reid]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
23694 All criterions of practical rationality derive from goodness of will [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
23686 Moral reason is not just neutral, because morality is part of the standard of rationality [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
23693 Practical rationality must weigh both what is morally and what is non-morally required [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
23687 Moral virtues arise from human nature, as part of what makes us good human beings [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / k. Ethics from nature
22493 Sterility is a human defect, but the choice to be childless is not [Foot]
22492 Virtues are as necessary to humans as stings are to bees [Foot]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
22491 Moral evaluations are not separate from facts, but concern particular facts about functioning [Foot]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
22497 Deep happiness usually comes from the basic things in life [Foot]
22498 Happiness is enjoying the pursuit and attainment of right ends [Foot]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
23695 Good actions can never be justified by the good they brings to their agent [Foot]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 5. Free Rider
22499 We all know that just pretending to be someone's friend is not the good life [Foot]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
22495 Someone is a good person because of their rational will, not their body or memory [Foot]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 7. Existential Action
22502 Refraining from murder is not made good by authenticity or self-fulfilment [Foot]