18 ideas
9161 | Maybe reasonableness requires circular justifications - that is one coherentist view [Field,H] |
9160 | Lots of propositions are default reasonable, but the a priori ones are empirically indefeasible [Field,H] |
9164 | We treat basic rules as if they were indefeasible and a priori, with no interest in counter-evidence [Field,H] |
17771 | How we evaluate evidence depends on our background beliefs [Bayne] |
17770 | Clifford's dictum seems to block our beliefs in morality, politics and philosophy [Bayne] |
9165 | Reliability only makes a rule reasonable if we place a value on the truth produced by reliable processes [Field,H] |
9162 | Believing nothing, or only logical truths, is very reliable, but we want a lot more than that [Field,H] |
9166 | People vary in their epistemological standards, and none of them is 'correct' [Field,H] |
9163 | If we only use induction to assess induction, it is empirically indefeasible, and hence a priori [Field,H] |
17766 | Physicalism correlates brain and mind, explains causation by thought, and makes nature continuous [Bayne] |
17768 | Perception reveals what animals think, but humans can disengage thought from perception [Bayne] |
17769 | Some people centre space on themselves; others centre space on the earth [Bayne] |
17767 | The alternative to a language of thought is map-like or diagram-like thought [Bayne] |
22445 | Morality shows murder is wrong, but not what counts as a murder [Foot] |
22444 | A moral system must deal with the dangers and benefits of life [Foot] |
22447 | Saying something 'just is' right or wrong creates an illusion of fact and objectivity [Foot] |
22448 | We sometimes just use the word 'should' to impose a rule of conduct on someone [Foot] |
22446 | In the case of something lacking independence, calling it a human being is a matter of choice [Foot] |