Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Natural Goodness', 'Elements of Mind' and 'Political Philosophy (3rd ed)'

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80 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Wisdom only implies the knowledge achievable in any normal lifetime [Foot]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
The theory of descriptions supports internalism, since they are thinkable when the object is non-existent [Crane]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
Aesthetic properties of thing supervene on their physical properties [Crane]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
Constitution (as in a statue constituted by its marble) is supervenience without identity [Crane]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 7. Emergent Properties
The distinction between 'resultant' properties (weight) and 'emergent' properties is a bit vague [Crane]
If mental properties are emergent they add a new type of causation, and physics is not complete [Crane]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
Properties are causes [Crane]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
Traditional substance is separate from properties and capable of independent existence [Crane]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
Maybe beliefs don't need to be conscious, if you are not conscious of the beliefs guiding your actions [Crane]
Maybe there are two kinds of belief - 'de re' beliefs and 'de dicto' beliefs [Crane]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 6. Knowing How
Many cases of knowing how can be expressed in propositional terms (like how to get somewhere) [Crane]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
Phenol-thio-urea tastes bitter to three-quarters of people, but to the rest it is tasteless, so which is it? [Crane]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
One can taste that the wine is sour, and one can also taste the sourness of the wine [Crane]
The traditional supports for the sense datum theory were seeing double and specks before one's eyes [Crane]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
If we smell something we are aware of the smell separately, but we don't perceive a 'look' when we see [Crane]
The problems of perception disappear if it is a relation to an intentional state, not to an object or sense datum [Crane]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
If perception is much richer than our powers of description, this suggests that it is non-conceptual [Crane]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 8. Adverbial Theory
The adverbial theory of perceptions says it is the experiences which have properties, not the objects [Crane]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
Is knowledge just a state of mind, or does it also involve the existence of external things? [Crane]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness
The core of the consciousness problem is the case of Mary, zombies, and the Hard Question [Crane]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
Intentionalism does not require that all mental states be propositional attitudes [Crane]
Object-directed attitudes like love are just as significant as propositional attitudes [Crane]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
If someone removes their glasses the content of experience remains, but the quality changes [Crane]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality
Pains have a region of the body as their intentional content, not some pain object [Crane]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia
Weak intentionalism says qualia are extra properties; strong intentionalism says they are intentional [Crane]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 6. Inverted Qualia
With inverted qualia a person's experiences would change, but their beliefs remain the same [Crane]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
Descartes did not think of minds as made of a substance, because they are not divisible [Crane]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism
Functionalism defines mental states by their causal properties, which rules out epiphenomenalism [Crane]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
The problems of misrepresentation and error have dogged physicalist reductions of intentionality [Crane]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
Properties dualism says mental properties are distinct from physical, despite a single underlying substance [Crane]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 4. Emergentism
Non-reductive physicalism seeks an explanation of supervenience, but emergentists accept it as basic [Crane]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
If mental supervenes on the physical, then every physical cause will be accompanied by a mental one [Crane]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Identity theory is either of particular events, or of properties, depending on your theory of causation [Crane]
Physicalism may be the source of the mind-body problem, rather than its solution [Crane]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 5. Causal Argument
Overdetermination occurs if two events cause an effect, when each would have caused it alone [Crane]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
The completeness of physics must be an essential component of any physicalist view of mind [Crane]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / c. Knowledge argument
Experience teaches us propositions, because we can reason about our phenomenal experience [Crane]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
The Twin Earth argument depends on reference being determined by content, which may be false. [Crane]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
Broad content entails the existence of the object of the thought [Crane]
18. Thought / C. Content / 8. Intension
In intensional contexts, truth depends on how extensions are conceived. [Crane]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
All criterions of practical rationality derive from goodness of will [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Moral reason is not just neutral, because morality is part of the standard of rationality [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
Practical rationality must weigh both what is morally and what is non-morally required [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Moral virtues arise from human nature, as part of what makes us good human beings [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / k. Ethics from nature
Sterility is a human defect, but the choice to be childless is not [Foot]
Virtues are as necessary to humans as stings are to bees [Foot]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
Moral evaluations are not separate from facts, but concern particular facts about functioning [Foot]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
Deep happiness usually comes from the basic things in life [Foot]
Happiness is enjoying the pursuit and attainment of right ends [Foot]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
Good actions can never be justified by the good they brings to their agent [Foot]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 5. Free Rider
We all know that just pretending to be someone's friend is not the good life [Foot]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
Someone is a good person because of their rational will, not their body or memory [Foot]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / h. Respect
We should respect the right of people to live in their own way, even if it is irrational [Swift]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 7. Existential Action
Refraining from murder is not made good by authenticity or self-fulfilment [Foot]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
Anti-colonial movements usually invoke the right of their 'people' to self-determination [Swift]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 4. Original Position / a. Original position
Isn't it more rational to maximise the average position, but with a safety net? [Swift]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / c. Social contract
Hypothetical contracts have no binding force [Swift]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 4. Citizenship
Cosmopolitans reject the right of different states to distribute resources in different ways [Swift]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / a. Nature of democracy
Democracy is bad, but the other systems are worse [Swift]
Since all opinions are treated as equal in democracy, it implies there are no right answers [Swift]
Design your democracy to treat citizens equally, or to produce better citizens? [Swift]
Design your democracy to yield political stability, or good decisions? [Swift]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / c. Direct democracy
Teledemocracy omits debate and deliberation, which are important parts of good decisions [Swift]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / f. Multiculturalism
Multiculturalism is a barrier to the whole state being a community [Swift]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / g. Liberalism critique
Liberals mistakenly think individuals choose their values, without reference to the community [Swift]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / a. Communitarianism
The best way to build a cohesive community is to be involved in a war [Swift]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / b. Against communitarianism
Membership and inclusion in a community implies non-membership and exclusion [Swift]
Liberals are concerned to protect individuals from too much community [Swift]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 8. Socialism
Redistributing wealth treats some people as means, rather than as ends [Swift]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 12. Feminism
Men have had the power to structure all of our social institutions [Swift]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
Maybe a freedom is from a restraint, and also in order to do something [Swift]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
Opportunity should ignore extraneous factors, or foster competence, or ignore all disadvantages [Swift]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
Inequalities are needed, as incentives to do the most important jobs [Swift]
A person can desire redistibution of wealth, without it being for reasons of equality [Swift]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 4. Property rights
You can't necessarily sell your legitimate right to something, even if you produced it [Swift]
Libertarians about property ignore the fact that private property is a denial of freedoms [Swift]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
Justice can be seen as fairness or entitlement or desert [Swift]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
Causation can be seen in counterfactual terms, or as increased probability, or as energy flow [Crane]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Causes are properties, not events, because properties are what make a difference in a situation [Crane]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
It seems that 'exists' could sometimes be a predicate [Crane]