Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Natural Goodness', 'Natural Kinds' and 'On Concept and Object'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


42 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Wisdom only implies the knowledge achievable in any normal lifetime [Foot]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
Philosophy is continuous with science, and has no external vantage point [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
A thought can be split in many ways, so that different parts appear as subject or predicate [Frege]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
Klein summarised geometry as grouped together by transformations [Quine]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / c. Fregean numbers
There is the concept, the object falling under it, and the extension (a set, which is also an object) [Frege, by George/Velleman]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Frege mistakenly takes existence to be a property of concepts, instead of being about things [Frege, by Yablo]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
Mass terms just concern spread, but other terms involve both spread and individuation [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
It is unclear whether Frege included qualities among his abstract objects [Frege, by Hale]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
Once we know the mechanism of a disposition, we can eliminate 'similarity' [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / d. Dispositions as occurrent
We judge things to be soluble if they are the same kind as, or similar to, things that do dissolve [Quine]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
Frege's 'objects' are both the referents of proper names, and what predicates are true or false of [Frege, by Dummett]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
Science is common sense, with a sophisticated method [Quine]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
Induction relies on similar effects following from each cause [Quine]
Induction is just more of the same: animal expectations [Quine]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
Grue is a puzzle because the notions of similarity and kind are dubious in science [Quine]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 7. Seeing Resemblance
General terms depend on similarities among things [Quine]
To learn yellow by observation, must we be told to look at the colour? [Quine]
Similarity is just interchangeability in the cosmic machine [Quine]
Standards of similarity are innate, and the spacing of qualities such as colours can be mapped [Quine]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
Frege equated the concepts under which an object falls with its properties [Frege, by Dummett]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / b. Concepts are linguistic
As I understand it, a concept is the meaning of a grammatical predicate [Frege]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
Frege felt that meanings must be public, so they are abstractions rather than mental entities [Frege, by Putnam]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
Projectible predicates can be universalised about the kind to which they refer [Quine]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
For all the multiplicity of languages, mankind has a common stock of thoughts [Frege]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
All criterions of practical rationality derive from goodness of will [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Moral reason is not just neutral, because morality is part of the standard of rationality [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
Practical rationality must weigh both what is morally and what is non-morally required [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Moral virtues arise from human nature, as part of what makes us good human beings [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / k. Ethics from nature
Sterility is a human defect, but the choice to be childless is not [Foot]
Virtues are as necessary to humans as stings are to bees [Foot]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
Moral evaluations are not separate from facts, but concern particular facts about functioning [Foot]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
Deep happiness usually comes from the basic things in life [Foot]
Happiness is enjoying the pursuit and attainment of right ends [Foot]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
Good actions can never be justified by the good they brings to their agent [Foot]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 5. Free Rider
We all know that just pretending to be someone's friend is not the good life [Foot]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
Someone is a good person because of their rational will, not their body or memory [Foot]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 7. Existential Action
Refraining from murder is not made good by authenticity or self-fulfilment [Foot]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
Quine probably regrets natural kinds now being treated as essences [Quine, by Dennett]
If similarity has no degrees, kinds cannot be contained within one another [Quine]
Comparative similarity allows the kind 'colored' to contain the kind 'red' [Quine]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 3. Knowing Kinds
You can't base kinds just on resemblance, because chains of resemblance are a muddle [Quine]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
It is hard to see how regularities could be explained [Quine]