Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Morality and Art', 'Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis' and 'Realism, Mathematics and Modality'

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18 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
11103 We aren't stuck with our native conceptual scheme; we can gradually change it [Quine]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 9. Fictional Mathematics
8714 Fictionalists say 2+2=4 is true in the way that 'Oliver Twist lived in London' is true [Field,H]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
11092 A river is a process, with stages; if we consider it as one thing, we are considering a process [Quine]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
11093 We don't say 'red' is abstract, unlike a river, just because it has discontinuous shape [Quine]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
11101 General terms don't commit us ontologically, but singular terms with substitution do [Quine]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
11096 Discourse generally departmentalizes itself to some degree [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 4. Concept Nominalism
11099 Understanding 'is square' is knowing when to apply it, not knowing some object [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 6. Mereological Nominalism
11094 'Red' is a single concrete object in space-time; 'red' and 'drop' are parts of a red drop [Quine]
11097 Red is the largest red thing in the universe [Quine]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
17595 To unite a sequence of ostensions to make one object, a prior concept of identity is needed [Quine]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
11095 We should just identify any items which are indiscernible within a given discourse [Quine]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / b. Concepts are linguistic
11104 Concepts are language [Quine]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
11102 Apply '-ness' or 'class of' to abstract general terms, to get second-level abstract singular terms [Quine]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
22445 Morality shows murder is wrong, but not what counts as a murder [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / c. Purpose of ethics
22444 A moral system must deal with the dangers and benefits of life [Foot]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
22447 Saying something 'just is' right or wrong creates an illusion of fact and objectivity [Foot]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 6. Motivation for Duty
22448 We sometimes just use the word 'should' to impose a rule of conduct on someone [Foot]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
22446 In the case of something lacking independence, calling it a human being is a matter of choice [Foot]