Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Natural Goodness', 'Russell's Ontological Development' and 'Reference and Generality (3rd ed)'

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22 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
22496 Wisdom only implies the knowledge achievable in any normal lifetime [Foot]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 12. Paraphrase
21699 Russell offered a paraphrase of definite description, to avoid the commitment to objects [Quine]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / d. Counting via concepts
12154 Are 'word token' and 'word type' different sorts of countable objects, or two ways of counting? [Geach, by Perry]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
8969 We should abandon absolute identity, confining it to within some category [Geach, by Hawthorne]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
16075 Denial of absolute identity has drastic implications for logic, semantics and set theory [Wasserman on Geach]
12152 Identity is relative. One must not say things are 'the same', but 'the same A as' [Geach]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
16073 Leibniz's Law is incomplete, since it includes a non-relativized identity predicate [Geach, by Wasserman]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / a. Sentence meaning
21700 Taking sentences as the unit of meaning makes useful paraphrasing possible [Quine]
21701 Knowing a word is knowing the meanings of sentences which contain it [Quine]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
23694 All criterions of practical rationality derive from goodness of will [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
23686 Moral reason is not just neutral, because morality is part of the standard of rationality [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
23693 Practical rationality must weigh both what is morally and what is non-morally required [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
23687 Moral virtues arise from human nature, as part of what makes us good human beings [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / k. Ethics from nature
22493 Sterility is a human defect, but the choice to be childless is not [Foot]
22492 Virtues are as necessary to humans as stings are to bees [Foot]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
22491 Moral evaluations are not separate from facts, but concern particular facts about functioning [Foot]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
22497 Deep happiness usually comes from the basic things in life [Foot]
22498 Happiness is enjoying the pursuit and attainment of right ends [Foot]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
23695 Good actions can never be justified by the good they brings to their agent [Foot]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 5. Free Rider
22499 We all know that just pretending to be someone's friend is not the good life [Foot]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
22495 Someone is a good person because of their rational will, not their body or memory [Foot]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 7. Existential Action
22502 Refraining from murder is not made good by authenticity or self-fulfilment [Foot]