13 ideas
7306 | If the only property of a name was its reference, we couldn't explain bearerless names [Miller,A] |
8431 | Problems with Goodman's view of counterfactuals led to a radical approach from Stalnaker and Lewis [Horwich] |
7322 | Constitutive scepticism is about facts, and epistemological scepticism about our ability to know them [Miller,A] |
22137 | Observation can force rejection of some part of the initial set of claims [Duhem, by Boulter] |
18197 | Experiments only test groups of hypotheses, and can't show which one is wrong [Duhem] |
7325 | Dispositions say what we will do, not what we ought to do, so can't explain normativity [Miller,A] |
7324 | Explain meaning by propositional attitudes, or vice versa, or together? [Miller,A] |
7323 | If truth is deflationary, sentence truth-conditions just need good declarative syntax [Miller,A] |
7315 | 'Jones is a married bachelor' does not have the logical form of a contradiction [Miller,A] |
7328 | The principle of charity is holistic, saying we must hold most of someone's system of beliefs to be true [Miller,A] |
7329 | Maybe we should interpret speakers as intelligible, rather than speaking truth [Miller,A] |
7333 | The Frege-Geach problem is that I can discuss the wrongness of murder without disapproval [Miller,A] |
8432 | Analyse counterfactuals using causation, not the other way around [Horwich] |