17 ideas
5784 | In its primary and formal sense, 'true' applies to propositions, not beliefs [Russell] |
5777 | The truth or falsehood of a belief depends upon a fact to which the belief 'refers' [Russell] |
5783 | Propositions of existence, generalities, disjunctions and hypotheticals make correspondence tricky [Russell] |
16730 | If matter is entirely atoms, anything else we notice in it can only be modes [Gassendi] |
14804 | Is chance just unknown laws? But the laws operate the same, whatever chance occurs [Peirce] |
5780 | The three questions about belief are its contents, its success, and its character [Russell] |
16619 | We observe qualities, and use 'induction' to refer to the substances lying under them [Gassendi] |
5778 | If we object to all data which is 'introspective' we will cease to believe in toothaches [Russell] |
5779 | There are distinct sets of psychological and physical causal laws [Russell] |
5781 | Our important beliefs all, if put into words, take the form of propositions [Russell] |
5782 | A proposition expressed in words is a 'word-proposition', and one of images an 'image-proposition' [Russell] |
5776 | A proposition is what we believe when we believe truly or falsely [Russell] |
14805 | Is there any such thing as death among the lower organisms? [Peirce] |
16593 | Atoms are not points, but hard indivisible things, which no force in nature can divide [Gassendi] |
16729 | How do mere atoms produce qualities like colour, flavour and odour? [Gassendi] |
14806 | If the world is just mechanical, its whole specification has no more explanation than mere chance [Peirce] |
14803 | The more precise the observations, the less reliable appear to be the laws of nature [Peirce] |