10 ideas
| 16730 | If matter is entirely atoms, anything else we notice in it can only be modes [Gassendi] |
| 16619 | We observe qualities, and use 'induction' to refer to the substances lying under them [Gassendi] |
| 4688 | We imagine small and large objects scaled to the same size, suggesting a fixed capacity for imagination [Lavers] |
| 6387 | A minimum requirement for a theory of meaning is that it include an account of truth [Davidson] |
| 6391 | A theory of truth tells us how communication by language is possible [Davidson] |
| 6388 | Is reference the key place where language and the world meet? [Davidson] |
| 6390 | With a holistic approach, we can give up reference in empirical theories of language [Davidson] |
| 6389 | To explain the reference of a name, you must explain its sentence-role, so reference can't be defined nonlinguistically [Davidson] |
| 16593 | Atoms are not points, but hard indivisible things, which no force in nature can divide [Gassendi] |
| 16729 | How do mere atoms produce qualities like colour, flavour and odour? [Gassendi] |