Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Syntagma', 'Trees, Terms and Truth' and 'Treatise 4: The Moral Sense'

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24 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
Reason is our power of finding out true propositions [Hutcheson]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
If facts are the truthmakers, they are not in the world [Engelbretsen]
There are no 'falsifying' facts, only an absence of truthmakers [Engelbretsen]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 1. Aristotelian Logic
Traditional term logic struggled to express relations [Engelbretsen]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 3. Term Logic
Term logic rests on negated terms or denial, and that propositions are tied pairs [Engelbretsen]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 2. History of Logic
Was logic a branch of mathematics, or mathematics a branch of logic? [Engelbretsen]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
Logical syntax is actually close to surface linguistic form [Engelbretsen]
Propositions can be analysed as pairs of terms glued together by predication [Engelbretsen]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not
Standard logic only negates sentences, even via negated general terms or predicates [Engelbretsen]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Existence and nonexistence are characteristics of the world, not of objects [Engelbretsen]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
Facts are not in the world - they are properties of the world [Engelbretsen]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 4. Category Realism
Individuals are arranged in inclusion categories that match our semantics [Engelbretsen]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes
If matter is entirely atoms, anything else we notice in it can only be modes [Gassendi]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
We observe qualities, and use 'induction' to refer to the substances lying under them [Gassendi]
19. Language / B. Reference / 2. Denoting
Terms denote objects with properties, and statements denote the world with that property [Engelbretsen]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
'Socrates is wise' denotes a sentence; 'that Socrates is wise' denotes a proposition [Engelbretsen]
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
Negating a predicate term and denying its unnegated version are quite different [Engelbretsen]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
Can't the moral sense make mistakes, as the other senses do? [Hutcheson]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
Happiness is a pleasant sensation, or continued state of such sensations [Hutcheson]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
You can't form moral rules without an end, which needs feelings and a moral sense [Hutcheson]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
Atoms are not points, but hard indivisible things, which no force in nature can divide [Gassendi]
How do mere atoms produce qualities like colour, flavour and odour? [Gassendi]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / a. Divine morality
We are asked to follow God's ends because he is our benefactor, but why must we do that? [Hutcheson]
Why may God not have a superior moral sense very similar to ours? [Hutcheson]