15 ideas
| 8251 | The logical space of reasons is a natural phenomenon, and it is the realm of freedom [McDowell] |
| 16730 | If matter is entirely atoms, anything else we notice in it can only be modes [Gassendi] |
| 14221 | Serious essentialism says everything has essences, they're not things, and they ground necessities [Shalkowski] |
| 14222 | Essences are what it is to be that (kind of) thing - in fact, they are the thing's identity [Shalkowski] |
| 14226 | We distinguish objects by their attributes, not by their essences [Shalkowski] |
| 14225 | Critics say that essences are too mysterious to be known [Shalkowski] |
| 14223 | De dicto necessity has linguistic entities as their source, so it is a type of de re necessity [Shalkowski] |
| 8128 | Representation must be propositional if it can give reasons and be epistemological [McDowell, by Burge] |
| 19092 | There is no pure Given, but it is cultured, rather than entirely relative [McDowell, by Macbeth] |
| 8253 | Sense impressions already have conceptual content [McDowell] |
| 16619 | We observe qualities, and use 'induction' to refer to the substances lying under them [Gassendi] |
| 14224 | Equilateral and equiangular aren't the same, as we have to prove their connection [Shalkowski] |
| 8254 | Forming concepts by abstraction from the Given is private definition, which the Private Lang. Arg. attacks [McDowell] |
| 16593 | Atoms are not points, but hard indivisible things, which no force in nature can divide [Gassendi] |
| 16729 | How do mere atoms produce qualities like colour, flavour and odour? [Gassendi] |