15 ideas
| 4742 | Correspondence may be one-many or many one, as when either p or q make 'p or q' true [Armstrong] |
| 9497 | Without modality, Armstrong falls back on fictionalism to support counterfactual laws [Bird on Armstrong] |
| 15550 | Properties are contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
| 16730 | If matter is entirely atoms, anything else we notice in it can only be modes [Gassendi] |
| 4743 | The truth-maker for a truth must necessitate that truth [Armstrong] |
| 16619 | We observe qualities, and use 'induction' to refer to the substances lying under them [Gassendi] |
| 2534 | Mindless bodies are zombies, bodiless minds are ghosts [Sturgeon] |
| 2537 | Types are properties, and tokens are events. Are they split between mental and physical, or not? [Sturgeon] |
| 2532 | Intentionality isn't reducible, because of its experiential aspect [Sturgeon] |
| 2533 | Rule-following can't be reduced to the physical [Sturgeon] |
| 2535 | The main argument for physicalism is its simple account of causation [Sturgeon] |
| 2536 | Do facts cause thoughts, or embody them, or what? [Sturgeon] |
| 16593 | Atoms are not points, but hard indivisible things, which no force in nature can divide [Gassendi] |
| 16729 | How do mere atoms produce qualities like colour, flavour and odour? [Gassendi] |
| 4798 | In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation [Armstrong, by Psillos] |