Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Syntagma', 'The Common-Sense View of Reality' and 'In Defense of Essentialism'

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19 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
20728 Metaphysics is hopeless with its present epistemology; common-sense realism is needed [Colvin]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
20726 We can only distinguish self from non-self if there is an inflexible external reality [Colvin]
20727 Common-sense realism rests on our interests and practical life [Colvin]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
20729 Arguments that objects are unknowable or non-existent assume the knower's existence [Colvin]
20730 If objects are doubted because their appearances change, that presupposes one object [Colvin]
20731 The idea that everything is relations is contradictory; relations are part of the concept of things [Colvin]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes
16730 If matter is entirely atoms, anything else we notice in it can only be modes [Gassendi]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
14193 'Substance theorists' take modal properties as primitive, without structure, just falling under a sortal [Paul,LA]
14195 If an object's sort determines its properties, we need to ask what determines its sort [Paul,LA]
14196 Substance essentialism says an object is multiple, as falling under various different sortals [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
14198 Absolutely unrestricted qualitative composition would allow things with incompatible properties [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
14190 Deep essentialist objects have intrinsic properties that fix their nature; the shallow version makes it contextual [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
14191 Deep essentialists say essences constrain how things could change; modal profiles fix natures [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
14192 Essentialism must deal with charges of arbitrariness, and failure to reduce de re modality [Paul,LA]
14197 An object's modal properties don't determine its possibilities [Paul,LA]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
14189 'Modal realists' believe in many concrete worlds, 'actualists' in just this world, 'ersatzists' in abstract other worlds [Paul,LA]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
16619 We observe qualities, and use 'induction' to refer to the substances lying under them [Gassendi]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
16593 Atoms are not points, but hard indivisible things, which no force in nature can divide [Gassendi]
16729 How do mere atoms produce qualities like colour, flavour and odour? [Gassendi]