20 ideas
14092 | Philosophers are often too fussy about words, dismissing perfectly useful ordinary terms [Rosen] |
14100 | Figuring in the definition of a thing doesn't make it a part of that thing [Rosen] |
14096 | Explanations fail to be monotonic [Rosen] |
14097 | Things could be true 'in virtue of' others as relations between truths, or between truths and items [Rosen] |
14095 | Facts are structures of worldly items, rather like sentences, individuated by their ingredients [Rosen] |
14093 | An 'intrinsic' property is one that depends on a thing and its parts, and not on its relations [Rosen] |
16730 | If matter is entirely atoms, anything else we notice in it can only be modes [Gassendi] |
23651 | Universals are not objects of sense and cannot be imagined - but can be conceived [Reid] |
23650 | Only individuals exist [Reid] |
23649 | No one thinks two sheets possess a single whiteness, but all agree they are both white [Reid] |
11874 | Real identity admits of no degrees [Reid] |
14094 | The excellent notion of metaphysical 'necessity' cannot be defined [Rosen] |
14101 | Are necessary truths rooted in essences, or also in basic grounding laws? [Rosen] |
16619 | We observe qualities, and use 'induction' to refer to the substances lying under them [Gassendi] |
23652 | We must first conceive things before we can consider them [Reid] |
23648 | First we notice and name attributes ('abstracting'); then we notice that subjects share them ('generalising') [Reid] |
14099 | 'Bachelor' consists in or reduces to 'unmarried' male, but not the other way around [Rosen] |
16593 | Atoms are not points, but hard indivisible things, which no force in nature can divide [Gassendi] |
16729 | How do mere atoms produce qualities like colour, flavour and odour? [Gassendi] |
14098 | An acid is just a proton donor [Rosen] |