Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Philosophy as a way of life', 'An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth' and 'The Case for Closure'

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22 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 6. Hopes for Philosophy
9198 It is no longer possible to be a sage, but we can practice the exercise of wisdom [Hadot]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 2. Logos
9197 The logos represents a demand for universal rationality [Hadot]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 7. Falsehood
16477 Asserting not-p is saying p is false [Russell]
4. Formal Logic / C. Predicate Calculus PC / 2. Tools of Predicate Calculus / e. Existential quantifier ∃
16484 There are four experiences that lead us to talk of 'some' things [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
16486 The physical world doesn't need logic, but the mental world does [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
2947 Questions wouldn't lead anywhere without the law of excluded middle [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / e. or
16479 'Or' expresses hesitation, in a dog at a crossroads, or birds risking grabbing crumbs [Russell]
16480 A disjunction expresses indecision [Russell]
16483 Disjunction may also arise in practice if there is imperfect memory. [Russell]
16481 'Or' expresses a mental state, not something about the world [Russell]
16487 Maybe the 'or' used to describe mental states is not the 'or' of logic [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / c. Grelling's paradox
16475 A 'heterological' predicate can't be predicated of itself; so is 'heterological' heterological? Yes=no! [Russell]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
16482 All our knowledge (if verbal) is general, because all sentences contain general words [Russell]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty
19553 Commitment to 'I have a hand' only makes sense in a context where it has been doubted [Hawthorne]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / a. Naïve realism
4758 Naïve realism leads to physics, but physics then shows that naïve realism is false [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
16476 For simple words, a single experience can show that they are true [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
16485 Perception can't prove universal generalisations, so abandon them, or abandon empiricism? [Russell]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure
19551 How can we know the heavyweight implications of normal knowledge? Must we distort 'knowledge'? [Hawthorne]
19552 We wouldn't know the logical implications of our knowledge if small risks added up to big risks [Hawthorne]
19554 Denying closure is denying we know P when we know P and Q, which is absurd in simple cases [Hawthorne]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
16478 A mother cat is paralysed if equidistant between two needy kittens [Russell]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / b. Types of pleasure
9196 The pleasure of existing is the only genuine pleasure [Hadot]