Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Philosophy as a way of life', 'Tarski on Truth and Logical Consequence' and 'Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology'

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19 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 6. Hopes for Philosophy
It is no longer possible to be a sage, but we can practice the exercise of wisdom [Hadot]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 2. Logos
The logos represents a demand for universal rationality [Hadot]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
Moral realism doesn't seem to entail the existence of any things [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
Surely if some propositions are grounded in existence, they all are? [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
Orthodox Truthmaker applies to all propositions, and necessitates their truth [Cameron]
God fixes all the truths of the world by fixing what exists [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
What the proposition says may not be its truthmaker [Cameron]
Rather than what exists, some claim that the truthmakers are ways of existence, dispositions, modalities etc [Cameron]
Truthmaking doesn't require realism, because we can be anti-realist about truthmakers [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 6. Making Negative Truths
Without truthmakers, negative truths must be ungrounded [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
Maybe truthmaking and correspondence stand together, and are interdefinable [Cameron]
I support the correspondence theory because I believe in truthmakers [Cameron]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
'Snow is white' depends on meaning; whether snow is white depends on snow [Etchemendy]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
We can get a substantive account of Tarski's truth by adding primitive 'true' to the object language [Etchemendy]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
For realists it is analytic that truths are grounded in the world [Cameron]
Realism says a discourse is true or false, and some of it is true [Cameron]
Realism says truths rest on mind-independent reality; truthmaking theories are about which features [Cameron]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
We should reject distinct but indiscernible worlds [Cameron]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / b. Types of pleasure
The pleasure of existing is the only genuine pleasure [Hadot]