12 ideas
17311 | Real definitions don't just single out a thing; they must also explain its essence [Koslicki] |
17312 | It is more explanatory if you show how a number is constructed from basic entities and relations [Koslicki] |
17314 | The relata of grounding are propositions or facts, but for dependence it is objects and their features [Koslicki] |
17313 | Modern views want essences just to individuate things across worlds and times [Koslicki] |
17309 | For Fine, essences are propositions true because of identity, so they are just real definitions [Koslicki] |
17315 | We need a less propositional view of essence, and so must distinguish it clearly from real definitions [Koslicki] |
21513 | We can no more expect a precise definition of coherence than we can of the moral ideal [Ewing] |
21497 | If undetailed, 'coherence' is just a vague words that covers all possible arguments [Ewing] |
7458 | The reliability of witnesses depends on whether they benefit from their observations [Laplace, by Hacking] |
17317 | A good explanation captures the real-world dependence among the phenomena [Koslicki] |
3441 | If a supreme intellect knew all atoms and movements, it could know all of the past and the future [Laplace] |
17316 | We can abstract to a dependent entity by blocking out features of its bearer [Koslicki] |