Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Philosophical Essay on Probability', 'Grounding Concepts' and 'Essence and Potentiality'

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27 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
17729 Examining concepts can recover information obtained through the senses [Jenkins]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 2. Correspondence to Facts
17740 Instead of correspondence of proposition to fact, look at correspondence of its parts [Jenkins]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
17730 Combining the concepts of negation and finiteness gives the concept of infinity [Jenkins]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
17719 Arithmetic concepts are indispensable because they accurately map the world [Jenkins]
17717 Senses produce concepts that map the world, and arithmetic is known through these concepts [Jenkins]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
17724 It is not easy to show that Hume's Principle is analytic or definitive in the required sense [Jenkins]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / c. Grounding and explanation
17727 We can learn about the world by studying the grounding of our concepts [Jenkins]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
17720 There's essential, modal, explanatory, conceptual, metaphysical and constitutive dependence [Jenkins, by PG]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 4. Category Realism
17728 The concepts we have to use for categorising are ones which map the real world well [Jenkins]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
17954 Essence is a thing's necessities, but what about its possibilities (which may not be realised)? [Vetter]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
17953 Real definition fits abstracta, but not individual concrete objects like Socrates [Vetter]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
17952 Modal accounts make essence less mysterious, by basing them on the clearer necessity [Vetter]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
17959 Metaphysical necessity is even more deeply empirical than Kripke has argued [Vetter]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
17955 Possible worlds allow us to talk about degrees of possibility [Vetter]
17957 Maybe possibility is constituted by potentiality [Vetter]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / c. Possible but inconceivable
17958 The apparently metaphysically possible may only be epistemically possible [Vetter]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
17956 Closeness of worlds should be determined by the intrinsic nature of relevant objects [Vetter]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
17726 Examining accurate, justified or grounded concepts brings understanding of the world [Jenkins]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
17734 It is not enough that intuition be reliable - we need to know why it is reliable [Jenkins]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
17723 Knowledge is true belief which can be explained just by citing the proposition believed [Jenkins]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 7. Testimony
7458 The reliability of witnesses depends on whether they benefit from their observations [Laplace, by Hacking]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
3441 If a supreme intellect knew all atoms and movements, it could know all of the past and the future [Laplace]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / b. Empirical concepts
17718 Grounded concepts are trustworthy maps of the world [Jenkins]
17739 The physical effect of world on brain explains the concepts we possess [Jenkins]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
17731 Verificationism is better if it says meaningfulness needs concepts grounded in the senses [Jenkins]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
17732 Success semantics explains representation in terms of success in action [Jenkins]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 1. Analytic Propositions
17725 'Analytic' can be conceptual, or by meaning, or predicate inclusion, or definition... [Jenkins]