14 ideas
| 18415 | The actual world is just the world you are in [Lewis, by Cappelen/Dever] |
| 16392 | A content is a property, and believing it is self-ascribing that property [Lewis, by Recanati] |
| 7458 | The reliability of witnesses depends on whether they benefit from their observations [Laplace, by Hacking] |
| 17499 | Theoretical models can represent, by mapping onto the data-models [Portides] |
| 17498 | In the 'received view' models are formal; the 'semantic view' emphasises representation [Portides, by PG] |
| 17501 | Representational success in models depends on success of their explanations [Portides] |
| 17502 | The best model of the atomic nucleus is the one which explains the most results [Portides] |
| 17496 | 'Model' belongs in a family of concepts, with representation, idealisation and abstraction [Portides] |
| 17497 | Models are theory-driven, or phenomenological (more empirical and specific) [Portides] |
| 17500 | General theories may be too abstract to actually explain the mechanisms [Portides] |
| 3441 | If a supreme intellect knew all atoms and movements, it could know all of the past and the future [Laplace] |
| 18416 | Attitudes involve properties (not propositions), and belief is self-ascribing the properties [Lewis, by Solomon] |
| 16390 | Lewis's popular centred worlds approach gives an attitude an index of world, subject and time [Lewis, by Recanati] |
| 18418 | A theory of perspectival de se content gives truth conditions relative to an agent [Lewis, by Cappelen/Dever] |