19 ideas
18901 | Truthmakers are facts 'of' a domain, not something 'in' the domain [Sommers] |
18904 | 'Predicable' terms come in charged pairs, with one the negation of the other [Sommers, by Engelbretsen] |
18895 | Logic which maps ordinary reasoning must be transparent, and free of variables [Sommers] |
18897 | Predicate logic has to spell out that its identity relation '=' is an equivalent relation [Sommers] |
18893 | Translating into quantificational idiom offers no clues as to how ordinary thinkers reason [Sommers] |
18903 | Sommers promotes the old idea that negation basically refers to terms [Sommers, by Engelbretsen] |
18894 | Predicates form a hierarchy, from the most general, down to names at the bottom [Sommers] |
10631 | If 'x is heterological' iff it does not apply to itself, then 'heterological' is heterological if it isn't heterological [Hale/Wright] |
10624 | The incompletability of formal arithmetic reveals that logic also cannot be completely characterized [Hale/Wright] |
10629 | If structures are relative, this undermines truth-value and objectivity [Hale/Wright] |
10628 | The structural view of numbers doesn't fit their usage outside arithmetical contexts [Hale/Wright] |
10622 | The neo-Fregean is more optimistic than Frege about contextual definitions of numbers [Hale/Wright] |
18900 | Unfortunately for realists, modern logic cannot say that some fact exists [Sommers] |
10626 | Objects just are what singular terms refer to [Hale/Wright] |
7458 | The reliability of witnesses depends on whether they benefit from their observations [Laplace, by Hacking] |
3441 | If a supreme intellect knew all atoms and movements, it could know all of the past and the future [Laplace] |
10630 | Abstracted objects are not mental creations, but depend on equivalence between given entities [Hale/Wright] |
18898 | In standard logic, names are the only way to refer [Sommers] |
10627 | Many conceptual truths ('yellow is extended') are not analytic, as derived from logic and definitions [Hale/Wright] |