Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Philosophical Essay on Probability', 'Tarski's Theory of Truth' and 'Subjective View: sec qualities and indexicals'

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30 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 4. Uses of Truth
The notion of truth is to help us make use of the utterances of others [Field,H]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 9. Rejecting Truth
In the early 1930s many philosophers thought truth was not scientific [Field,H]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / a. Tarski's truth definition
Tarski reduced truth to reference or denotation [Field,H, by Hart,WD]
Tarski really explained truth in terms of denoting, predicating and satisfied functions [Field,H]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth
Tarski just reduced truth to some other undefined semantic notions [Field,H]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 2. Formal Truth
Tarski gives us the account of truth needed to build a group of true sentences in a model [Field,H]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
Model theory is unusual in restricting the range of the quantifiers [Field,H]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
To explain object qualities, primary qualities must be more than mere sources of experience [McGinn]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / b. Primary/secondary
Being red simply consists in looking red [McGinn]
Relativity means differing secondary perceptions are not real disagreements [McGinn]
Phenomenalism is correct for secondary qualities, so scepticism is there impossible [McGinn]
Maybe all possible sense experience must involve both secondary and primary qualities [McGinn]
You understood being red if you know the experience involved; not so with thngs being square [McGinn]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
You don't need to know how a square thing looks or feels to understand squareness [McGinn]
Touch doesn't provide direct experience of primary qualities, because touch feels temperature [McGinn]
We can perceive objectively, because primary qualities are not mind-created [McGinn]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
Lockean secondary qualities (unlike primaries) produce particular sensory experiences [McGinn]
Could there be a mind which lacked secondary quality perception? [McGinn]
Secondary qualities contain information; their variety would be superfluous otherwise [McGinn]
The utility theory says secondary qualities give information useful to human beings [McGinn]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
We see objects 'directly' by representing them [McGinn]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 7. Testimony
The reliability of witnesses depends on whether they benefit from their observations [Laplace, by Hacking]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
If a supreme intellect knew all atoms and movements, it could know all of the past and the future [Laplace]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
'Valence' and 'gene' had to be reduced to show their compatibility with physicalism [Field,H]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 9. Indexical Thought
The indexical perspective is subjective, incorrigible and constant [McGinn]
Indexical thought is in relation to my self-consciousness [McGinn]
Indexicals do not figure in theories of physics, because they are not explanatory causes [McGinn]
Indexical concepts are indispensable, as we need them for the power to act [McGinn]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
Field says reference is a causal physical relation between mental states and objects [Field,H, by Putnam]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 9. Indexical Semantics
I can know indexical truths a priori, unlike their non-indexical paraphrases [McGinn]