27 ideas
7454 | Gassendi is the first great empiricist philosopher [Hacking] |
1848 | We are coerced into assent to a truth by reason's violence [Aquinas] |
1858 | The mind is compelled by necessary truths, but not by contingent truths [Aquinas] |
1852 | For the mind Good is one truth among many, and Truth is one good among many [Aquinas] |
7447 | Probability was fully explained between 1654 and 1812 [Hacking] |
7448 | Probability is statistical (behaviour of chance devices) or epistemological (belief based on evidence) [Hacking] |
7449 | Epistemological probability based either on logical implications or coherent judgments [Hacking] |
1860 | Knowledge may be based on senses, but we needn't sense all our knowledge [Aquinas] |
7450 | In the medieval view, only deduction counted as true evidence [Hacking] |
7451 | Formerly evidence came from people; the new idea was that things provided evidence [Hacking] |
7458 | The reliability of witnesses depends on whether they benefit from their observations [Laplace, by Hacking] |
7452 | An experiment is a test, or an adventure, or a diagnosis, or a dissection [Hacking, by PG] |
7459 | Follow maths for necessary truths, and jurisprudence for contingent truths [Hacking] |
1855 | If we saw something as totally and utterly good, we would be compelled to will it [Aquinas] |
1856 | Nothing can be willed except what is good, but good is very varied, and so choices are unpredictable [Aquinas] |
1862 | However habituated you are, given time to ponder you can go against a habit [Aquinas] |
1849 | Since will is a reasoning power, it can entertain opposites, so it is not compelled to embrace one of them [Aquinas] |
1861 | The will is not compelled to move, even if pleasant things are set before it [Aquinas] |
1853 | Because the will moves by examining alternatives, it doesn't compel itself to will [Aquinas] |
1854 | We must admit that when the will is not willing something, the first movement to will must come from outside the will [Aquinas] |
3441 | If a supreme intellect knew all atoms and movements, it could know all of the past and the future [Laplace] |
1847 | The will must aim at happiness, but can choose the means [Aquinas] |
1857 | We don't have to will even perfect good, because we can choose not to think of it [Aquinas] |
1846 | The will can only want what it thinks is good [Aquinas] |
1850 | Without free will not only is ethical action meaningless, but also planning, commanding, praising and blaming [Aquinas] |
1851 | Good applies to goals, just as truth applies to ideas in the mind [Aquinas] |
1859 | Even a sufficient cause doesn't compel its effect, because interference could interrupt the process [Aquinas] |