18 ideas
| 14255 | We understand things through their dependency relations [Fine,K] |
| 14250 | Metaphysics deals with the existence of things and with the nature of things [Fine,K] |
| 14259 | Maybe two objects might require simultaneous real definitions, as with two simultaneous terms [Fine,K] |
| 14253 | An object's 'being' isn't existence; there's more to an object than existence, and its nature doesn't include existence [Fine,K] |
| 14251 | A natural modal account of dependence says x depends on y if y must exist when x does [Fine,K] |
| 14254 | Dependency is the real counterpart of one term defining another [Fine,K] |
| 14257 | An object depends on another if the second cannot be eliminated from the first's definition [Fine,K] |
| 14261 | There is 'weak' dependence in one definition, and 'strong' dependence in all the definitions [Fine,K] |
| 14252 | We should understand identity in terms of the propositions it renders true [Fine,K] |
| 18617 | Substances, unlike aggregates, can survive a change of parts [Mumford] |
| 14256 | How do we distinguish basic from derived esssences? [Fine,K] |
| 14258 | Maybe some things have essential relationships as well as essential properties [Fine,K] |
| 14260 | An object only essentially has a property if that property follows from every definition of the object [Fine,K] |
| 18618 | Maybe possibilities are recombinations of the existing elements of reality [Mumford] |
| 18619 | Combinatorial possibility has to allow all elements to be combinable, which seems unlikely [Mumford] |
| 18620 | Combinatorial possibility relies on what actually exists (even over time), but there could be more [Mumford] |
| 7458 | The reliability of witnesses depends on whether they benefit from their observations [Laplace, by Hacking] |
| 3441 | If a supreme intellect knew all atoms and movements, it could know all of the past and the future [Laplace] |