13 ideas
| 13230 | Particular essence is often captured by generality [Steiner,M] |
| 7440 | Secondary qualities are microscopic primary qualities of physical things [Armstrong] |
| 7458 | The reliability of witnesses depends on whether they benefit from their observations [Laplace, by Hacking] |
| 13229 | Maybe an instance of a generalisation is more explanatory than the particular case [Steiner,M] |
| 13231 | Explanatory proofs rest on 'characterizing properties' of entities or structure [Steiner,M] |
| 7437 | Consciousness and experience of qualities are not the same [Armstrong] |
| 3441 | If a supreme intellect knew all atoms and movements, it could know all of the past and the future [Laplace] |
| 7434 | Behaviourism is false, but mind is definable as the cause of behaviour [Armstrong] |
| 7436 | The manifestations of a disposition need never actually exist [Armstrong] |
| 7429 | Causal Functionalism says mental states are apt for producing behaviour [Armstrong] |
| 7438 | A causal theory of mentality would be improved by a teleological element [Armstrong] |
| 7431 | The identity of mental states with physical properties is contingent, because the laws of nature are contingent [Armstrong] |
| 7432 | One mental role might be filled by a variety of physical types [Armstrong] |