9 ideas
22153 | Quine rejects Carnap's view that science and philosophy are distinct [Quine, by Boulter] |
19485 | Names have no ontological commitment, because we can deny that they name anything [Quine] |
19486 | We can use quantification for commitment to unnameable things like the real numbers [Quine] |
13230 | Particular essence is often captured by generality [Steiner,M] |
7458 | The reliability of witnesses depends on whether they benefit from their observations [Laplace, by Hacking] |
13229 | Maybe an instance of a generalisation is more explanatory than the particular case [Steiner,M] |
13231 | Explanatory proofs rest on 'characterizing properties' of entities or structure [Steiner,M] |
3441 | If a supreme intellect knew all atoms and movements, it could know all of the past and the future [Laplace] |
19487 | Without the analytic/synthetic distinction, Carnap's ontology/empirical distinction collapses [Quine] |