73 ideas
326 | For relaxation one can consider the world of change, instead of eternal things [Plato] |
315 | Philosophy is the supreme gift of the gods to mortals [Plato] |
306 | Nothing can come to be without a cause [Plato] |
6653 | Syntactical methods of proof need only structure, where semantic methods (truth-tables) need truth [Lowe] |
324 | Before the existence of the world there must have been being, space and becoming [Plato] |
20364 | The apprehensions of reason remain unchanging, but reasonless sensation shows mere becoming [Plato] |
12042 | Plato's Forms were seen as part of physics, rather than of metaphysics [Plato, by Annas] |
307 | Something will always be well-made if the maker keeps in mind the eternal underlying pattern [Plato] |
318 | In addition to the underlying unchanging model and a changing copy of it, there must also be a foundation of all change [Plato] |
321 | For knowledge and true opinion to be different there must be Forms; otherwise we are just stuck with sensations [Plato] |
317 | The universe is basically an intelligible and unchanging model, and a visible and changing copy of it [Plato] |
6618 | A 'substance' is a thing that remains the same when its properties change [Lowe] |
6635 | Causal theories of belief make all beliefs true, and can't explain belief about the future [Lowe] |
6619 | Perhaps 'I' no more refers than the 'it' in 'it is raining' [Lowe] |
6643 | 'Ecological' approaches say we don't infer information, but pick it up directly from reality [Lowe] |
6638 | One must be able to visually recognise a table, as well as knowing its form [Lowe] |
6644 | Computationalists object that the 'ecological' approach can't tell us how we get the information [Lowe] |
6647 | Comparing shapes is proportional in time to the angle of rotation [Lowe] |
6639 | The 'disjunctive' theory of perception says true perceptions and hallucinations need have nothing in common [Lowe] |
6640 | A causal theorist can be a direct realist, if all objects of perception are external [Lowe] |
6645 | If blindsight shows we don't need perceptual experiences, the causal theory is wrong [Lowe] |
6637 | How could one paraphrase very complex sense-data reports adverbially? [Lowe] |
334 | Only bird-brained people think astronomy is entirely a matter of evidence [Plato] |
6667 | There are memories of facts, memories of practical skills, and autobiographical memory [Lowe] |
7458 | The reliability of witnesses depends on whether they benefit from their observations [Laplace, by Hacking] |
6642 | Psychologists say illusions only occur in unnatural and passive situations [Lowe] |
6641 | Externalists say minds depend on environment for their very existence and identity [Lowe] |
6617 | The main questions are: is mind distinct from body, and does it have unique properties? [Lowe] |
5962 | Plato says the soul is ordered by number [Plato, by Plutarch] |
6626 | 'Phenomenal' consciousness is of qualities; 'apperceptive' consciousness includes beliefs and desires [Lowe] |
6646 | The brain may have two systems for vision, with only the older one intact in blindsight [Lowe] |
6665 | Persons are selves - subjects of experience, with reflexive self-knowledge [Lowe] |
6670 | If my brain could survive on its own, I cannot be identical with my whole body [Lowe] |
6671 | It seems impossible to get generally applicable mental concepts from self-observation [Lowe] |
6666 | All human languages have an equivalent of the word 'I' [Lowe] |
330 | No one wants to be bad, but bad men result from physical and educational failures, which they do not want or choose [Plato] |
3441 | If a supreme intellect knew all atoms and movements, it could know all of the past and the future [Laplace] |
6625 | If qualia are causally inert, how can we even know about them? [Lowe] |
6621 | You can only identify behaviour by ascribing belief, so the behaviour can't explain the belief [Lowe] |
6654 | A computer program is equivalent to the person AND the manual [Lowe] |
6623 | Functionalism can't distinguish our experiences in spectrum inversion [Lowe] |
6628 | Functionalism only discusses relational properties of mental states, not intrinsic properties [Lowe] |
6629 | Functionalism commits us to bizarre possibilities, such as 'zombies' [Lowe] |
6622 | Non-reductive physicalism accepts token-token identity (not type-type) and asserts 'supervenience' of mind and brain [Lowe] |
6634 | Physicalists must believe in narrow content (because thoughts are merely the brain states) [Lowe] |
6630 | Eliminativism is incoherent if it eliminates reason and truth as well as propositional attitudes [Lowe] |
6648 | Some behaviourists believe thought is just suppressed speech [Lowe] |
6652 | 'Base rate neglect' makes people favour the evidence over its background [Lowe] |
6651 | People are wildly inaccurate in estimating probabilities about an observed event [Lowe] |
6655 | The 'Frame Problem' is how to program the appropriate application of general knowledge [Lowe] |
6657 | Computers can't be rational, because they lack motivation and curiosity [Lowe] |
6656 | The Turing test is too behaviourist, and too verbal in its methods [Lowe] |
6636 | The naturalistic views of how content is created are the causal theory and the teleological theory [Lowe] |
6633 | Twin Earth cases imply that even beliefs about kinds of stuff are indexical [Lowe] |
6632 | The same proposition provides contents for the that-clause of an utterance and a belief [Lowe] |
6631 | If propositions are abstract entities, how can minds depend on their causal powers? [Lowe] |
6659 | The three main theories of action involve the will, or belief-plus-desire, or an agent [Lowe] |
6661 | Libet gives empirical support for the will, as a kind of 'executive' mental operation [Lowe] |
6662 | We feel belief and desire as reasons for choice, not causes of choice [Lowe] |
6663 | People's actions are explained either by their motives, or their reasons, or the causes [Lowe] |
316 | Music has harmony like the soul, and serves to reorder disharmony within us [Plato] |
332 | One should exercise both the mind and the body, to avoid imbalance [Plato] |
328 | Everything that takes place naturally is pleasant [Plato] |
322 | Intelligence is the result of rational teaching; true opinion can result from irrational persuasion [Plato] |
331 | Bad governments prevent discussion, and discourage the study of virtue [Plato] |
310 | The creator of the cosmos had no envy, and so wanted things to be as like himself as possible [Plato] |
311 | The cosmos must be unique, because it resembles the creator, who is unique [Plato] |
325 | We must consider the four basic shapes as too small to see, only becoming visible in large numbers [Plato] |
327 | There are two types of cause, the necessary and the divine [Plato] |
314 | Heavenly movements gave us the idea of time, and caused us to inquire about the heavens [Plato] |
312 | Time came into existence with the heavens, so that there will be a time when they can be dissolved [Plato] |
309 | Clearly the world is good, so its maker must have been concerned with the eternal, not with change [Plato] |
308 | If the cosmos is an object of perception then it must be continually changing [Plato] |