Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Philosophical Essay on Probability', 'Mirror Mirror - Is That All?' and 'Logical Necessity'

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21 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
9327 Organisms understand their worlds better if they understand themselves [Gulick]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
12204 The logic of metaphysical necessity is S5 [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
12195 Soundness in argument varies with context, and may be achieved very informally indeed [Rumfitt]
12199 There is a modal element in consequence, in assessing reasoning from suppositions [Rumfitt]
12201 We reject deductions by bad consequence, so logical consequence can't be deduction [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 3. Contradiction
12194 Contradictions include 'This is red and not coloured', as well as the formal 'B and not-B' [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 2. Axiomatic Proof
12198 Geometrical axioms in logic are nowadays replaced by inference rules (which imply the logical truths) [Rumfitt]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
14532 A distinctive type of necessity is found in logical consequence [Rumfitt, by Hale/Hoffmann,A]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
12193 Logical necessity is when 'necessarily A' implies 'not-A is contradictory' [Rumfitt]
12200 A logically necessary statement need not be a priori, as it could be unknowable [Rumfitt]
12202 Narrow non-modal logical necessity may be metaphysical, but real logical necessity is not [Rumfitt]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
12203 If a world is a fully determinate way things could have been, can anyone consider such a thing? [Rumfitt]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
9325 In contrast with knowledge, the notion of understanding emphasizes practical engagement [Gulick]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 6. Knowing How
9326 Knowing-that is a much richer kind of knowing-how [Gulick]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 7. Testimony
7458 The reliability of witnesses depends on whether they benefit from their observations [Laplace, by Hacking]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness
9319 Is consciousness a type of self-awareness, or is being self-aware a way of being conscious? [Gulick]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
9320 Higher-order theories divide over whether the higher level involves thought or perception [Gulick]
9321 Higher-order models reduce the problem of consciousness to intentionality [Gulick]
9322 Maybe qualia only exist at the lower level, and a higher-level is needed for what-it-is-like [Gulick]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
3441 If a supreme intellect knew all atoms and movements, it could know all of the past and the future [Laplace]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 2. Life
9324 From the teleopragmatic perspective, life is largely an informational process [Gulick]