Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Philosophical Essay on Probability', 'Subjective and Objective' and 'Value Theory'

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21 ideas

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
18680 To avoid misunderstandings supervenience is often expressed negatively: no A-change without B-change [Orsi]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
3296 Sense-data are a false objectification of what is essentially subjective [Nagel]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 7. Testimony
7458 The reliability of witnesses depends on whether they benefit from their observations [Laplace, by Hacking]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / a. Mind
3295 Inner v outer brings astonishment that we are a particular person [Nagel]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
3293 If you assert that we have an ego, you can still ask if that future ego will be me [Nagel]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
3292 The most difficult problem of free will is saying what the problem is [Nagel]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
3441 If a supreme intellect knew all atoms and movements, it could know all of the past and the future [Laplace]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
18684 Rather than requiring an action, a reason may 'entice' us, or be 'eligible', or 'justify' it [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
18666 Value-maker concepts (such as courageous or elegant) simultaneously describe and evaluate [Orsi]
18667 The '-able' concepts (like enviable) say this thing deserves a particular response [Orsi]
18685 Final value is favoured for its own sake, and personal value for someone's sake [Orsi]
18679 Things are only valuable if something makes it valuable, and we can ask for the reason [Orsi]
18682 A complex value is not just the sum of the values of the parts [Orsi]
18683 Trichotomy Thesis: comparable values must be better, worse or the same [Orsi]
18686 The Fitting Attitude view says values are fitting or reasonable, and values are just byproducts [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
18672 Values from reasons has the 'wrong kind of reason' problem - admiration arising from fear [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
18677 A thing may have final value, which is still derived from other values, or from relations [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / a. Normativity
18668 Truths about value entail normative truths about actions or attitudes [Orsi]
18670 The Buck-Passing view of normative values says other properties are reasons for the value [Orsi]
18669 Values can be normative in the Fitting Attitude account, where 'good' means fitting favouring [Orsi]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
3294 As far as possible we should become instruments to realise what is best from an eternal point of view [Nagel]