Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Philosophical Essay on Probability', 'The Trouble with Possible Worlds' and 'Non-Monotonic Logic'

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18 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
The Razor seems irrelevant for Meinongians, who allow absolutely everything to exist [Lycan]
Maybe Ockham's Razor is a purely aesthetic principle [Lycan]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 1. Argument
You can 'rebut' an argument's conclusion, or 'undercut' its premises [Antonelli]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 1. Nonclassical Logics
We infer that other objects are like some exceptional object, if they share some of its properties [Antonelli]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 12. Non-Monotonic Logic
Reasoning may be defeated by new premises, or by finding out more about the given ones [Antonelli]
Should we accept Floating Conclusions, derived from two arguments in conflict? [Antonelli]
Weakest Link Principle: prefer the argument whose weakest link is the stronger [Antonelli]
Non-monotonic core: Reflexivity, Cut, Cautious Monotonicity, Left Logical Equivalence, Right Weakening [Antonelli]
We can rank a formula by the level of surprise if it were to hold [Antonelli]
People don't actually use classical logic, but may actually use non-monotonic logic [Antonelli]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 10. Monotonicity
In classical logic the relation |= has Monotony built into its definition [Antonelli]
Cautious Monotony ignores proved additions; Rational Monotony fails if the addition's negation is proved [Antonelli]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
Maybe non-existent objects are sets of properties [Lycan]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
Treating possible worlds as mental needs more actual mental events [Lycan]
Possible worlds must be made of intensional objects like propositions or properties [Lycan]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / c. Worlds as propositions
If 'worlds' are sentences, and possibility their consistency, consistency may rely on possibility [Lycan]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 7. Testimony
The reliability of witnesses depends on whether they benefit from their observations [Laplace, by Hacking]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
If a supreme intellect knew all atoms and movements, it could know all of the past and the future [Laplace]