Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'poems', 'Treatise of Human Nature, Appendix' and 'A Version of Internalist Foundationalism'

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23 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
8893 For any given area, there seem to be a huge number of possible coherent systems of beliefs [Bonjour]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
8888 The concept of knowledge is so confused that it is best avoided [Bonjour]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs
20189 Belief is a feeling, independent of the will, which arises from uncontrolled and unknown causes [Hume]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
8887 It is hard to give the concept of 'self-evident' a clear and defensible characterization [Bonjour]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 8. Adverbial Theory
8897 The adverbial account will still be needed when a mind apprehends its sense-data [Bonjour]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
21309 A proposition cannot be intelligible or consistent, if the perceptions are not so [Hume]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
8896 Conscious states have built-in awareness of content, so we know if a conceptual description of it is correct [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
8891 My incoherent beliefs about art should not undermine my very coherent beliefs about physics [Bonjour]
8892 Coherence seems to justify empirical beliefs about externals when there is no external input [Bonjour]
8894 Coherentists must give a reason why coherent justification is likely to lead to the truth [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
8889 Reliabilists disagree over whether some further requirement is needed to produce knowledge [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
8890 If the reliable facts producing a belief are unknown to me, my belief is not rational or responsible [Bonjour]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
8895 If neither the first-level nor the second-level is itself conscious, there seems to be no consciousness present [Bonjour]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 7. Seeing Resemblance
15755 Hume needs a notion which includes degrees of resemblance [Shoemaker on Hume]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 5. Self as Associations
5323 Experiences are logically separate, but factually linked by simultaneity or a feeling of continuousness [Ayer on Hume]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity
21311 Are self and substance the same? Then how can self remain if substance changes? [Hume]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / c. Inadequacy of mental continuity
21312 Perceptions are distinct, so no connection between them can ever be discovered [Hume]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
21308 We have no impression of the self, and we therefore have no idea of it [Hume]
21310 Does an oyster with one perception have a self? Would lots of perceptions change that? [Hume]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
6017 Nomos is king [Pindar]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
23115 We have no natural love of mankind, other than through various relationships [Hume]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
16946 Causation is just invariance, as long as it is described in general terms [Quine on Hume]
15250 If impressions, memories and ideas only differ in vivacity, nothing says it is memory, or repetition [Whitehead on Hume]