25 ideas
15053 | If metaphysics can't be settled, it hardly matters whether it makes sense [Fine,K] |
15054 | 'Quietist' says abandon metaphysics because answers are unattainable (as in Kant's noumenon) [Fine,K] |
15007 | If you make 'grounding' fundamental, you have to mention some non-fundamental notions [Sider on Fine,K] |
15006 | Something is grounded when it holds, and is explained, and necessitated by something else [Fine,K, by Sider] |
15055 | Grounding relations are best expressed as relations between sentences [Fine,K] |
15050 | Reduction might be producing a sentence which gets closer to the logical form [Fine,K] |
15051 | Reduction might be semantic, where a reduced sentence is understood through its reduction [Fine,K] |
15052 | Reduction is modal, if the reductions necessarily entail the truth of the target sentence [Fine,K] |
15056 | The notion of reduction (unlike that of 'ground') implies the unreality of what is reduced [Fine,K] |
15047 | What is real can only be settled in terms of 'ground' [Fine,K] |
15046 | Reality is a primitive metaphysical concept, which cannot be understood in other terms [Fine,K] |
15048 | In metaphysics, reality is regarded as either 'factual', or as 'fundamental' [Fine,K] |
15060 | Why should what is explanatorily basic be therefore more real? [Fine,K] |
15061 | Although colour depends on us, we can describe the world that way if it picks out fundamentals [Fine,K] |
19544 | Closure says if you know P, and also know P implies Q, then you must know Q [Dretske] |
19545 | We needn't regret the implications of our regrets; regretting drinking too much implies the past is real [Dretske] |
19546 | Knowing by visual perception is not the same as knowing by implication [Dretske] |
19547 | Reasons for believing P may not transmit to its implication, Q [Dretske] |
19548 | The only way to preserve our homely truths is to abandon closure [Dretske] |
19549 | P may imply Q, but evidence for P doesn't imply evidence for Q, so closure fails [Dretske] |
19550 | We know past events by memory, but we don't know the past is real (an implication) by memory [Dretske] |
15059 | Grounding is an explanation of truth, and needs all the virtues of good explanations [Fine,K] |
15057 | Ultimate explanations are in 'grounds', which account for other truths, which hold in virtue of the grounding [Fine,K] |
15058 | A proposition ingredient is 'essential' if changing it would change the truth-value [Fine,K] |
6017 | Nomos is king [Pindar] |