20 ideas
19304 | The rules of reasoning are not the rules of logic [Harman] |
19306 | It is a principle of reasoning not to clutter your mind with trivialities [Harman] |
19307 | If there is a great cost to avoiding inconsistency, we learn to reason our way around it [Harman] |
19309 | Logic has little relevance to reasoning, except when logical conclusions are immediate [Harman] |
19303 | Implication just accumulates conclusions, but inference may also revise our views [Harman] |
11181 | Aristotelian essentialism involves a 'natural' or 'causal' interpretation of modal operators [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11184 | Aristotelian essentialism is about shared properties, individuating essentialism about distinctive properties [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11180 | Essentialist sentences are not theorems of modal logic, and can even be false [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11186 | 'Essentially' won't replace 'necessarily' for vacuous properties like snub-nosed or self-identical [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11185 | 'Is essentially' has a different meaning from 'is necessarily', as they often cannot be substituted [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11182 | If essences are objects with only essential properties, they are elusive in possible worlds [Marcus (Barcan)] |
19305 | The Gambler's Fallacy (ten blacks, so red is due) overemphasises the early part of a sequence [Harman] |
19310 | High probability premises need not imply high probability conclusions [Harman] |
11183 | The use of possible worlds is to sort properties (not to individuate objects) [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11187 | In possible worlds, names are just neutral unvarying pegs for truths and predicates [Marcus (Barcan)] |
19308 | We strongly desire to believe what is true, even though logic does not require it [Harman] |
19311 | In revision of belief, we need to keep track of justifications for foundations, but not for coherence [Harman] |
19312 | Coherence is intelligible connections, especially one element explaining another [Harman] |
6017 | Nomos is king [Pindar] |
11189 | Dispositional essences are special, as if an object loses them they cease to exist [Marcus (Barcan)] |