39 ideas
9023 | If you say that a contradiction is true, you change the meaning of 'not', and so change the subject [Quine] |
9376 | A sentence may simultaneously define a term, and also assert a fact [Boghossian] |
9012 | Talk of 'truth' when sentences are mentioned; it reminds us that reality is the point of sentences [Quine] |
9011 | Truth is redundant for single sentences; we do better to simply speak the sentence [Quine] |
9013 | We can eliminate 'or' from our basic theory, by paraphrasing 'p or q' as 'not(not-p and not-q)' [Quine] |
9020 | My logical grammar has sentences by predication, then negation, conjunction, and existential quantification [Quine] |
9028 | Maybe logical truth reflects reality, but in different ways in different languages [Quine] |
10014 | Quine rejects second-order logic, saying that predicates refer to multiple objects [Quine, by Hodes] |
10828 | Quantifying over predicates is treating them as names of entities [Quine] |
9024 | Excluded middle has three different definitions [Quine] |
10012 | Quantification theory can still be proved complete if we add identity [Quine] |
9016 | Names are not essential, because naming can be turned into predication [Quine] |
9015 | Universal quantification is widespread, but it is definable in terms of existential quantification [Quine] |
9025 | You can't base quantification on substituting names for variables, if the irrationals cannot all be named [Quine] |
9026 | Some quantifications could be false substitutionally and true objectually, because of nameless objects [Quine] |
10705 | Putting a predicate letter in a quantifier is to make it the name of an entity [Quine] |
9375 | Conventionalism agrees with realists that logic has truth values, but not over the source [Boghossian] |
9027 | A sentence is logically true if all sentences with that grammatical structure are true [Quine] |
9017 | Predicates are not names; predicates are the other parties to predication [Quine] |
9018 | A physical object is the four-dimensional material content of a portion of space-time [Quine] |
9019 | Four-d objects helps predication of what no longer exists, and quantification over items from different times [Quine] |
9014 | Some conditionals can be explained just by negation and conjunction: not(p and not-q) [Quine] |
9369 | 'Snow is white or it isn't' is just true, not made true by stipulation [Boghossian] |
9367 | The a priori is explained as analytic to avoid a dubious faculty of intuition [Boghossian] |
9373 | That logic is a priori because it is analytic resulted from explaining the meaning of logical constants [Boghossian] |
9380 | We can't hold a sentence true without evidence if we can't agree which sentence is definitive of it [Boghossian] |
9384 | We may have strong a priori beliefs which we pragmatically drop from our best theory [Boghossian] |
9374 | If we learn geometry by intuition, how could this faculty have misled us for so long? [Boghossian] |
9378 | If meaning depends on conceptual role, what properties are needed to do the job? [Boghossian] |
9377 | 'Conceptual role semantics' says terms have meaning from sentences and/or inferences [Boghossian] |
9009 | Single words are strongly synonymous if their interchange preserves truth [Quine] |
9372 | Could expressions have meaning, without two expressions possibly meaning the same? [Boghossian] |
9007 | It makes no sense to say that two sentences express the same proposition [Quine] |
9008 | There is no rule for separating the information from other features of sentences [Quine] |
9010 | We can abandon propositions, and just talk of sentences and equivalence [Quine] |
17721 | There are no truths in virtue of meaning, but there is knowability in virtue of understanding [Boghossian, by Jenkins] |
9368 | Epistemological analyticity: grasp of meaning is justification; metaphysical: truth depends on meaning [Boghossian] |
9021 | A good way of explaining an expression is saying what conditions make its contexts true [Quine] |
6017 | Nomos is king [Pindar] |