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All the ideas for 'poems', 'Analyticity Reconsidered' and 'Philosophy of Logic'

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39 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
9023 If you say that a contradiction is true, you change the meaning of 'not', and so change the subject [Quine]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
9376 A sentence may simultaneously define a term, and also assert a fact [Boghossian]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
9012 Talk of 'truth' when sentences are mentioned; it reminds us that reality is the point of sentences [Quine]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth
9011 Truth is redundant for single sentences; we do better to simply speak the sentence [Quine]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / e. Axioms of PL
9013 We can eliminate 'or' from our basic theory, by paraphrasing 'p or q' as 'not(not-p and not-q)' [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
9020 My logical grammar has sentences by predication, then negation, conjunction, and existential quantification [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
9028 Maybe logical truth reflects reality, but in different ways in different languages [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
10014 Quine rejects second-order logic, saying that predicates refer to multiple objects [Quine, by Hodes]
10828 Quantifying over predicates is treating them as names of entities [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
9024 Excluded middle has three different definitions [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic
10012 Quantification theory can still be proved complete if we add identity [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / f. Names eliminated
9016 Names are not essential, because naming can be turned into predication [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
9015 Universal quantification is widespread, but it is definable in terms of existential quantification [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
9025 You can't base quantification on substituting names for variables, if the irrationals cannot all be named [Quine]
9026 Some quantifications could be false substitutionally and true objectually, because of nameless objects [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
10705 Putting a predicate letter in a quantifier is to make it the name of an entity [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 2. Formal Truth
9375 Conventionalism agrees with realists that logic has truth values, but not over the source [Boghossian]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
9027 A sentence is logically true if all sentences with that grammatical structure are true [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
9017 Predicates are not names; predicates are the other parties to predication [Quine]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
9018 A physical object is the four-dimensional material content of a portion of space-time [Quine]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
9019 Four-d objects helps predication of what no longer exists, and quantification over items from different times [Quine]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / b. Types of conditional
9014 Some conditionals can be explained just by negation and conjunction: not(p and not-q) [Quine]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
9369 'Snow is white or it isn't' is just true, not made true by stipulation [Boghossian]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
9367 The a priori is explained as analytic to avoid a dubious faculty of intuition [Boghossian]
9373 That logic is a priori because it is analytic resulted from explaining the meaning of logical constants [Boghossian]
9380 We can't hold a sentence true without evidence if we can't agree which sentence is definitive of it [Boghossian]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 11. Denying the A Priori
9384 We may have strong a priori beliefs which we pragmatically drop from our best theory [Boghossian]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
9374 If we learn geometry by intuition, how could this faculty have misled us for so long? [Boghossian]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / c. Meaning by Role
9378 If meaning depends on conceptual role, what properties are needed to do the job? [Boghossian]
9377 'Conceptual role semantics' says terms have meaning from sentences and/or inferences [Boghossian]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 8. Synonymy
9009 Single words are strongly synonymous if their interchange preserves truth [Quine]
9372 Could expressions have meaning, without two expressions possibly meaning the same? [Boghossian]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique
9007 It makes no sense to say that two sentences express the same proposition [Quine]
9008 There is no rule for separating the information from other features of sentences [Quine]
9010 We can abandon propositions, and just talk of sentences and equivalence [Quine]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
17721 There are no truths in virtue of meaning, but there is knowability in virtue of understanding [Boghossian, by Jenkins]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic
9368 Epistemological analyticity: grasp of meaning is justification; metaphysical: truth depends on meaning [Boghossian]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / a. Contextual meaning
9021 A good way of explaining an expression is saying what conditions make its contexts true [Quine]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
6017 Nomos is king [Pindar]