Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'poems', 'How Things Might Have Been' and 'The Nature of Mathematics'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


27 ideas

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
Philosophy is an experimental science, resting on common experience [Peirce]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
Self-contradiction doesn't reveal impossibility; it is inductive impossibility which reveals self-contradiction [Peirce]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism
Logic, unlike mathematics, is not hypothetical; it asserts categorical ends from hypothetical means [Peirce]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
Mathematics is close to logic, but is even more abstract [Peirce]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
A principle of individuation may pinpoint identity and distinctness, now and over time [Mackie,P]
Individuation may include counterfactual possibilities, as well as identity and persistence [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
A haecceity is the essential, simple, unanalysable property of being-this-thing [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
Essentialism must avoid both reduplication of essences, and multiple occupancy by essences [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
An individual essence is the properties the object could not exist without [Mackie,P]
No other object can possibly have the same individual essence as some object [Mackie,P]
There are problems both with individual essences and without them [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
Unlike Hesperus=Phosophorus, water=H2O needs further premisses before it is necessary [Mackie,P]
Why are any sortals essential, and why are only some of them essential? [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
The Kripke and Putnam view of kinds makes them explanatorily basic, but has modal implications [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
Origin is not a necessity, it is just 'tenacious'; we keep it fixed in counterfactual discussions [Mackie,P]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
Some logical possibility concerns single propositions, but there is also compatibility between propositions [Peirce]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
Transworld identity without individual essences leads to 'bare identities' [Mackie,P]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
De re modality without bare identities or individual essence needs counterparts [Mackie,P]
Things may only be counterparts under some particular relation [Mackie,P]
Possibilities for Caesar must be based on some phase of the real Caesar [Mackie,P]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
The theory of 'haecceitism' does not need commitment to individual haecceities [Mackie,P]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
Experience is indeed our only source of knowledge, provided we include inner experience [Peirce]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
The world is one of experience, but experiences are always located among our ideas [Peirce]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
Locke's kind essences are explanatory, without being necessary to the kind [Mackie,P]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
Ethics is the science of aims [Peirce]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
Nomos is king [Pindar]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 6. Necessity of Kinds
Maybe the identity of kinds is necessary, but instances being of that kind is not [Mackie,P]