14 ideas
| 18755 | Validity is explained as truth in all models, because that relies on the logical terms [McGee] |
| 18751 | Natural language includes connectives like 'because' which are not truth-functional [McGee] |
| 18761 | Second-order variables need to range over more than collections of first-order objects [McGee] |
| 18753 | An ontologically secure semantics for predicate calculus relies on sets [McGee] |
| 18754 | Logically valid sentences are analytic truths which are just true because of their logical words [McGee] |
| 18757 | Soundness theorems are uninformative, because they rely on soundness in their proofs [McGee] |
| 12154 | Are 'word token' and 'word type' different sorts of countable objects, or two ways of counting? [Geach, by Perry] |
| 18760 | The culmination of Euclidean geometry was axioms that made all models isomorphic [McGee] |
| 8969 | We should abandon absolute identity, confining it to within some category [Geach, by Hawthorne] |
| 16075 | Denial of absolute identity has drastic implications for logic, semantics and set theory [Wasserman on Geach] |
| 12152 | Identity is relative. One must not say things are 'the same', but 'the same A as' [Geach] |
| 16073 | Leibniz's Law is incomplete, since it includes a non-relativized identity predicate [Geach, by Wasserman] |
| 18762 | A maxim claims that if we are allowed to assert a sentence, that means it must be true [McGee] |
| 6017 | Nomos is king [Pindar] |