Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'reports', 'Intellectual Autobiography' and 'Causes and Conditions'

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19 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
Truthmakers are facts 'of' a domain, not something 'in' the domain [Sommers]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 3. Term Logic
'Predicable' terms come in charged pairs, with one the negation of the other [Sommers, by Engelbretsen]
Logic which maps ordinary reasoning must be transparent, and free of variables [Sommers]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic
Predicate logic has to spell out that its identity relation '=' is an equivalent relation [Sommers]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
Translating into quantificational idiom offers no clues as to how ordinary thinkers reason [Sommers]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not
Sommers promotes the old idea that negation basically refers to terms [Sommers, by Engelbretsen]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 7. Predicates in Logic
Predicates form a hierarchy, from the most general, down to names at the bottom [Sommers]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
Unfortunately for realists, modern logic cannot say that some fact exists [Sommers]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 8. Transcendental Necessity
Even the gods cannot strive against necessity [Pittacus, by Diog. Laertius]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
In standard logic, names are the only way to refer [Sommers]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / a. Observation of causation
Some says mental causation is distinct because we can recognise single occurrences [Mackie]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Mackie tries to analyse singular causal statements, but his entities are too vague for events [Kim on Mackie]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
Necessity and sufficiency are best suited to properties and generic events, not individual events [Kim on Mackie]
A cause is part of a wider set of conditions which suffices for its effect [Mackie, by Crane]
Necessary conditions are like counterfactuals, and sufficient conditions are like factual conditionals [Mackie]
The INUS account interprets single events, and sequences, causally, without laws being known [Mackie]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
A cause is an Insufficient but Necessary part of an Unnecessary but Sufficient condition [Mackie]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
Mackie has a nomological account of general causes, and a subjunctive conditional account of single ones [Mackie, by Tooley]
The virus causes yellow fever, and is 'the' cause; sweets cause tooth decay, but they are not 'the' cause [Mackie]