Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Protagoras', 'Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit' and 'Exigency to Exist in Essences'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

23 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 4. Contraries
192 Only one thing can be contrary to something [Plato]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
19400 Possibles demand existence, so as many of them as possible must actually exist [Leibniz]
19401 God's sufficient reason for choosing reality is in the fitness or perfection of possibilities [Leibniz]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / c. Self-predication
190 If asked whether justice itself is just or unjust, you would have to say that it is just [Plato]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
19402 The actual universe is the richest composite of what is possible [Leibniz]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 3. Value of Knowledge
20184 The only real evil is loss of knowledge [Plato]
20185 The most important things in life are wisdom and knowledge [Plato]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 7. Seeing Resemblance
191 Everything resembles everything else up to a point [Plato]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
203 Courage is knowing what should or shouldn't be feared [Plato]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
6237 Fear of God is not conscience, which is a natural feeling of offence at bad behaviour [Shaftesbury]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
6234 If an irrational creature with kind feelings was suddenly given reason, its reason would approve of kind feelings [Shaftesbury]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / j. Evil
202 No one willingly and knowingly embraces evil [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
6233 A person isn't good if only tying their hands prevents their mischief, so the affections decide a person's morality [Shaftesbury]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / h. Good as benefit
193 Some things are good even though they are not beneficial to men [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
200 People tend only to disapprove of pleasure if it leads to pain, or prevents future pleasure [Plato]
197 Some pleasures are not good, and some pains are not evil [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / d. Sources of pleasure
6236 People more obviously enjoy social pleasures than they do eating and drinking [Shaftesbury]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
6235 Self-interest is not intrinsically good, but its absence is evil, as public good needs it [Shaftesbury]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
6232 Every creature has a right and a wrong state which guide its actions, so there must be a natural end [Shaftesbury]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / d. Teaching virtue
188 Socrates did not believe that virtue could be taught [Plato]
189 If we punish wrong-doers, it shows that we believe virtue can be taught [Plato]
204 Socrates is contradicting himself in claiming virtue can't be taught, but that it is knowledge [Plato]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / b. Euthyphro question
5642 For Shaftesbury, we must already have a conscience to be motivated to religious obedience [Shaftesbury, by Scruton]