46 ideas
2056 | Philosophers are always switching direction to something more interesting [Plato] |
2086 | Understanding mainly involves knowing the elements, not their combinations [Plato] |
2083 | Either a syllable is its letters (making parts as knowable as whole) or it isn't (meaning it has no parts) [Plato] |
2082 | A rational account is essentially a weaving together of things with names [Plato] |
2052 | Eristic discussion is aggressive, but dialectic aims to help one's companions in discussion [Plato] |
15854 | A primary element has only a name, and no logos, but complexes have an account, by weaving the names [Plato] |
12619 | We have no successful definitions, because they all use indefinable words [Fodor] |
10216 | We master arithmetic by knowing all the numbers in our soul [Plato] |
12620 | If 'exist' is ambiguous in 'chairs and numbers exist', that mirrors the difference between chairs and numbers [Fodor] |
2060 | There seem to be two sorts of change: alteration and motion [Plato] |
12613 | Empiricists use dispositions reductively, as 'possibility of sensation' or 'possibility of experimental result' [Fodor] |
2084 | If a word has no parts and has a single identity, it turns out to be the same kind of thing as a letter [Plato] |
15844 | A sum is that from which nothing is lacking, which is a whole [Plato] |
15843 | The whole can't be the parts, because it would be all of the parts, which is the whole [Plato] |
2080 | Things are only knowable if a rational account (logos) is possible [Plato] |
16126 | Expertise is knowledge of the whole by means of the parts [Plato] |
2050 | It is impossible to believe something which is held to be false [Plato] |
2076 | How can a belief exist if its object doesn't exist? [Plato] |
2045 | Perception is infallible, suggesting that it is knowledge [Plato] |
2067 | Our senses could have been separate, but they converge on one mind [Plato] |
2068 | With what physical faculty do we perceive pairs of opposed abstract qualities? [Plato] |
2078 | You might mistake eleven for twelve in your senses, but not in your mind [Plato] |
2069 | Thought must grasp being itself before truth becomes possible [Plato] |
12617 | Associationism can't explain how truth is preserved [Fodor] |
2089 | An inadequate rational account would still not justify knowledge [Plato] |
2085 | Parts and wholes are either equally knowable or equally unknowable [Plato] |
2091 | Without distinguishing marks, how do I know what my beliefs are about? [Plato] |
2087 | A rational account might be seeing an image of one's belief, like a reflection in a mirror [Plato] |
2090 | A rational account involves giving an image, or analysis, or giving a differentiating mark [Plato] |
2081 | Maybe primary elements can be named, but not receive a rational account [Plato] |
2088 | A rational account of a wagon would mean knowledge of its hundred parts [Plato] |
2047 | What evidence can be brought to show whether we are dreaming or not? [Plato] |
2053 | If you claim that all beliefs are true, that includes beliefs opposed to your own [Plato] |
2059 | How can a relativist form opinions about what will happen in the future? [Plato] |
2054 | Clearly some people are superior to others when it comes to medicine [Plato] |
12615 | Mental representations are the old 'Ideas', but without images [Fodor] |
6650 | Fodor is now less keen on the innateness of concepts [Fodor, by Lowe] |
12618 | It is essential to the concept CAT that it be satisfied by cats [Fodor] |
12614 | I prefer psychological atomism - that concepts are independent of epistemic capacities [Fodor] |
12621 | Definable concepts have constituents, which are necessary, individuate them, and demonstrate possession [Fodor] |
12622 | Many concepts lack prototypes, and complex prototypes aren't built from simple ones [Fodor] |
12623 | The theory theory can't actually tell us what concepts are [Fodor] |
12616 | English has no semantic theory, just associations between sentences and thoughts [Fodor] |
16570 | Elements are found last in dismantling bodies, and first in generating them [Albert of Saxony] |
2058 | God must be the epitome of goodness, and we can only approach a divine state by being as good as possible [Plato] |
2057 | There must always be some force of evil ranged against good [Plato] |