65 ideas
16227 | Philosophers are good at denying the obvious [Hawley] |
16123 | Whenever you perceive a community of things, you should also hunt out differences in the group [Plato] |
23250 | Desired responsible actions result either from rational or from irrational desire [Aristotle] |
5847 | It is the role of dialectic to survey syllogisms [Aristotle] |
16125 | To reveal a nature, divide down, and strip away what it has in common with other things [Plato] |
16124 | No one wants to define 'weaving' just for the sake of weaving [Plato] |
16216 | Part of the sense of a proper name is a criterion of the thing's identity [Hawley] |
16211 | A homogeneous rotating disc should be undetectable according to Humean supervenience [Hawley] |
16219 | Non-linguistic things cannot be indeterminate, because they don't have truth-values at all [Hawley] |
16223 | Maybe for the world to be vague, it must be vague in its foundations? [Hawley] |
16226 | Epistemic vagueness seems right in the case of persons [Hawley] |
16208 | Supervaluation refers to one vaguely specified thing, through satisfaction by everything in some range [Hawley] |
16221 | Supervaluationism takes what the truth-value would have been if indecision was resolved [Hawley] |
16230 | Maybe the only properties are basic ones like charge, mass and spin [Hawley] |
16232 | An object is 'natural' if its stages are linked by certain non-supervenient relations [Hawley] |
16200 | Are sortals spatially maximal - so no cat part is allowed to be a cat? [Hawley] |
16237 | The modal features of statue and lump are disputed; when does it stop being that statue? [Hawley] |
16238 | Perdurantists can adopt counterpart theory, to explain modal differences of identical part-sums [Hawley] |
16220 | Vagueness is either in our knowledge, in our talk, or in reality [Hawley] |
16222 | Indeterminacy in objects and in properties are not distinct cases [Hawley] |
16228 | The constitution theory is endurantism plus more than one object in a place [Hawley] |
16229 | Constitution theory needs sortal properties like 'being a sweater' to distinguish it from its thread [Hawley] |
14492 | If the constitution view says thread and sweater are two things, why do we talk of one thing? [Hawley] |
16193 | 'Adverbialism' explains change by saying an object has-at-some-time a given property [Hawley] |
16195 | Presentism solves the change problem: the green banana ceases, so can't 'relate' to the yellow one [Hawley] |
16202 | The problem of change arises if there must be 'identity' of a thing over time [Hawley] |
16192 | Endurance theory can relate properties to times, or timed instantiations to properties [Hawley] |
16196 | Endurance is a sophisticated theory, covering properties, instantiation and time [Hawley] |
16197 | How does perdurance theory explain our concern for our own future selves? [Hawley] |
16191 | Perdurance needs an atemporal perspective, to say that the object 'has' different temporal parts [Hawley] |
16199 | If an object is the sum of all of its temporal parts, its mass is staggeringly large! [Hawley] |
16201 | Perdurance says things are sums of stages; Stage Theory says each stage is the thing [Hawley] |
16240 | If a life is essentially the sum of its temporal parts, it couldn't be shorter or longer than it was? [Hawley] |
16203 | Stage Theory seems to miss out the link between stages of the same object [Hawley] |
16204 | Stage Theory says every stage is a distinct object, which gives too many objects [Hawley] |
16212 | An isolated stage can't be a banana (which involves suitable relations to other stages) [Hawley] |
16213 | Stages of one thing are related by extrinsic counterfactual and causal relations [Hawley] |
16205 | The stages of Stage Theory seem too thin to populate the world, or to be referred to [Hawley] |
16206 | Stages must be as fine-grained in length as change itself, so any change is a new stage [Hawley] |
16225 | If two things might be identical, there can't be something true of one and false of the other [Hawley] |
16239 | To decide whether something is a counterpart, we need to specify a relevant sortal concept [Hawley] |
5961 | The soul gets its goodness from god, and its evil from previous existence. [Plato] |
5862 | A single counterexample is enough to prove that a truth is not necessary [Aristotle] |
5854 | Nobody fears a disease which nobody has yet caught [Aristotle] |
16218 | On any theory of self, it is hard to explain why we should care about our future selves [Hawley] |
5849 | Rhetoric is a political offshoot of dialectic and ethics [Aristotle] |
283 | The question of whether or not to persuade comes before the science of persuasion [Plato] |
282 | Non-physical beauty can only be shown clearly by speech [Plato] |
5851 | Pentathletes look the most beautiful, because they combine speed and strength [Aristotle] |
5858 | Men are physically prime at thirty-five, and mentally prime at forty-nine [Aristotle] |
5855 | We all feel universal right and wrong, independent of any community or contracts [Aristotle] |
5850 | Happiness is composed of a catalogue of internal and external benefits [Aristotle] |
5856 | Self-interest is a relative good, but nobility an absolute good [Aristotle] |
5853 | The best virtues are the most useful to others [Aristotle] |
5848 | All good things can be misused, except virtue [Aristotle] |
281 | The arts produce good and beautiful things by preserving the mean [Plato] |
5857 | The young feel pity from philanthropy, but the old from self-concern [Aristotle] |
5859 | Rich people are mindlessly happy [Aristotle] |
5852 | The four constitutions are democracy (freedom), oligarchy (wealth), aristocracy (custom), tyranny (security) [Aristotle] |
22559 | Democracy is the worst of good constitutions, but the best of bad constitutions [Plato, by Aristotle] |
1660 | It is noble to avenge oneself on one's enemies, and not come to terms with them [Aristotle] |
5861 | People assume events cause what follows them [Aristotle] |
16215 | Causation is nothing more than the counterfactuals it grounds? [Hawley] |
16207 | Time could be discrete (like integers) or dense (rationals) or continuous (reals) [Hawley] |
279 | Only divine things can always stay the same, and bodies are not like that [Plato] |