Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Theaetetus', 'Tractatus Theologico-Politicus' and 'On What There Is'

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95 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Philosophers are always switching direction to something more interesting [Plato]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 2. Analysis by Division
Understanding mainly involves knowing the elements, not their combinations [Plato]
Either a syllable is its letters (making parts as knowable as whole) or it isn't (meaning it has no parts) [Plato]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
Without reason and human help, human life is misery [Spinoza]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
A rational account is essentially a weaving together of things with names [Plato]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 3. Eristic
Eristic discussion is aggressive, but dialectic aims to help one's companions in discussion [Plato]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
A primary element has only a name, and no logos, but complexes have an account, by weaving the names [Plato]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
We study bound variables not to know reality, but to know what reality language asserts [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / f. Names eliminated
Canonical notation needs quantification, variables and predicates, but not names [Quine, by Orenstein]
Quine extended Russell's defining away of definite descriptions, to also define away names [Quine, by Orenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
Names can be converted to descriptions, and Russell showed how to eliminate those [Quine]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
We master arithmetic by knowing all the numbers in our soul [Plato]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
Logicists cheerfully accept reference to bound variables and all sorts of abstract entities [Quine]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 7. Formalism
Formalism says maths is built of meaningless notations; these build into rules which have meaning [Quine]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / b. Intuitionism
Intuitionism says classes are invented, and abstract entities are constructed from specified ingredients [Quine]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / c. Conceptualism
Conceptualism holds that there are universals but they are mind-made [Quine]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
For Quine, there is only one way to exist [Quine, by Shapiro]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / g. Particular being
The idea of a thing and the idea of existence are two sides of the same coin [Quine, by Crane]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Quine rests existence on bound variables, because he thinks singular terms can be analysed away [Quine, by Hale]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
There seem to be two sorts of change: alteration and motion [Plato]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Ontologies
Quine's ontology is wrong; his question is scientific, and his answer is partly philosophical [Fine,K on Quine]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
What actually exists does not, of course, depend on language [Quine]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
To be is to be the value of a variable, which amounts to being in the range of reference of a pronoun [Quine]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / d. Commitment of theories
Fictional quantification has no ontology, so we study ontology through scientific theories [Quine, by Orenstein]
An ontology is like a scientific theory; we accept the simplest scheme that fits disorderly experiences [Quine]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
If commitment rests on first-order logic, we obviously lose the ontology concerning predication [Maudlin on Quine]
If to be is to be the value of a variable, we must already know the values available [Jacquette on Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
Realism, conceptualism and nominalism in medieval universals reappear in maths as logicism, intuitionism and formalism [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
There is no entity called 'redness', and that some things are red is ultimate and irreducible [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
Quine has argued that predicates do not have any ontological commitment [Quine, by Armstrong]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
Treating scattered sensations as single objects simplifies our understanding of experience [Quine]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
If a word has no parts and has a single identity, it turns out to be the same kind of thing as a letter [Plato]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
A sum is that from which nothing is lacking, which is a whole [Plato]
The whole can't be the parts, because it would be all of the parts, which is the whole [Plato]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 3. A Posteriori Necessary
Quine's indispensability argument said arguments for abstracta were a posteriori [Quine, by Yablo]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
Can an unactualized possible have self-identity, and be distinct from other possibles? [Quine]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
Things are only knowable if a rational account (logos) is possible [Plato]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
Expertise is knowledge of the whole by means of the parts [Plato]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
It is impossible to believe something which is held to be false [Plato]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs
How can a belief exist if its object doesn't exist? [Plato]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
We can never translate our whole language of objects into phenomenalism [Quine]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
Perception is infallible, suggesting that it is knowledge [Plato]
Our senses could have been separate, but they converge on one mind [Plato]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
With what physical faculty do we perceive pairs of opposed abstract qualities? [Plato]
Thought must grasp being itself before truth becomes possible [Plato]
You might mistake eleven for twelve in your senses, but not in your mind [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
An inadequate rational account would still not justify knowledge [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
Parts and wholes are either equally knowable or equally unknowable [Plato]
Without distinguishing marks, how do I know what my beliefs are about? [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
A rational account might be seeing an image of one's belief, like a reflection in a mirror [Plato]
A rational account involves giving an image, or analysis, or giving a differentiating mark [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
Maybe primary elements can be named, but not receive a rational account [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
A rational account of a wagon would mean knowledge of its hundred parts [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 5. Dream Scepticism
What evidence can be brought to show whether we are dreaming or not? [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
If you claim that all beliefs are true, that includes beliefs opposed to your own [Plato]
Clearly some people are superior to others when it comes to medicine [Plato]
How can a relativist form opinions about what will happen in the future? [Plato]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
People are only free if they are guided entirely by reason [Spinoza]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
There is an attempt to give a verificationist account of meaning, without the error of reducing everything to sensations [Dennett on Quine]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 10. Denial of Meanings
The word 'meaning' is only useful when talking about significance or about synonymy [Quine]
I do not believe there is some abstract entity called a 'meaning' which we can 'have' [Quine]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
Quine relates predicates to their objects, by being 'true of' them [Quine, by Davidson]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
Peoples are created by individuals, not by nature, and only distinguished by language and law [Spinoza]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / c. Natural rights
In nature everything has an absolute right to do anything it is capable of doing [Spinoza]
Natural rights are determined by desire and power, not by reason [Spinoza]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
Society exists to extend human awareness [Spinoza, by Watson]
The state aims to allow personal development, so its main purpose is freedom [Spinoza]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / a. Sovereignty
Sovereignty must include the power to make people submit to it [Spinoza]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / b. Monarchy
Kings tend to fight wars for glory, rather than for peace and liberty [Spinoza]
Deposing a monarch is dangerous, because the people are used to royal authority [Spinoza]
Monarchs are always proud, and can't back down [Spinoza]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 4. Changing the State / c. Revolution
Every state is more frightened of its own citizens than of external enemies [Spinoza]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / c. Direct democracy
Democracy is a legitimate gathering of people who do whatever they can do [Spinoza]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 10. Theocracy
Allowing religious ministers any control of the state is bad for both parties [Spinoza]
If religion is law, then piety is justice, impiety is crime, and non-believers must leave [Spinoza]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 1. Slavery
Slavery is not just obedience, but acting only in the interests of the master [Spinoza]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 2. Freedom of belief
Government is oppressive if opinions can be crimes, because people can't give them up [Spinoza]
Without liberty of thought there is no trust in the state, and corruption follows [Spinoza]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 3. Free speech
Treason may be committed as much by words as by deeds [Spinoza]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 6. Political freedom
The freest state is a rational one, where people can submit themselves to reason [Spinoza]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
Spinoza wanted democracy based on individual rights, and is thus the first modern political philosopher [Stewart,M on Spinoza]
The sovereignty has absolute power over citizens [Spinoza]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 3. Alienating rights
Forming a society meant following reason, and giving up dangerous appetites and mutual harm [Spinoza]
People only give up their rights, and keep promises, if they hope for some greater good [Spinoza]
Once you have given up your rights, there is no going back [Spinoza]
In democracy we don't abandon our rights, but transfer them to the majority of us [Spinoza]
No one, in giving up their power and right, ceases to be a human being [Spinoza]
Everyone who gives up their rights must fear the recipients of them [Spinoza]
The early Hebrews, following Moses, gave up their rights to God alone [Spinoza]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / c. Natural law
The order of nature does not prohibit anything, and allows whatever appetite produces [Spinoza]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 2. Religion in Society
State and religious law can clash, so the state must make decisions about religion [Spinoza]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / c. God is the good
God must be the epitome of goodness, and we can only approach a divine state by being as good as possible [Plato]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 2. Judaism
Hebrews were very hostile to other states, who had not given up their rights to God [Spinoza]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 5. Bible
The Bible has nothing in common with reasoning and philosophy [Spinoza]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / a. Problem of Evil
There must always be some force of evil ranged against good [Plato]