Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Meno', 'Foundations of Geometry' and 'World and Essence'

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25 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
1922 Spiritual qualities only become advantageous with the growth of wisdom [Plato]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism
10053 Geometrical axioms imply the propositions, but the former may not be true [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 2. Aporiai
11259 How can you seek knowledge of something if you don't know it? [Plato]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Geometry
10052 Geometry is united by the intuitive axioms of projective geometry [Russell, by Musgrave]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
16435 Plantinga proposes necessary existent essences as surrogates for the nonexistent things [Plantinga, by Stalnaker]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
14655 The 'identity criteria' of a name are a group of essential and established facts [Plantinga]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
14658 'Being Socrates' and 'being identical with Socrates' characterise Socrates, so they are among his properties [Plantinga]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
14656 Does Socrates have essential properties, plus a unique essence (or 'haecceity') which entails them? [Plantinga]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
14654 Properties are 'trivially essential' if they are instantiated by every object in every possible world [Plantinga]
14653 X is essentially P if it is P in every world, or in every X-world, or in the actual world (and not ¬P elsewhere) [Plantinga]
14660 If a property is ever essential, can it only ever be an essential property? [Plantinga]
14661 Essences are instantiated, and are what entails a thing's properties and lack of properties [Plantinga]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
14657 Does 'being identical with Socrates' name a property? I can think of no objections to it [Plantinga]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
14652 'De re' modality is as clear as 'de dicto' modality, because they are logically equivalent [Plantinga]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
14659 We can imagine being beetles or alligators, so it is possible we might have such bodies [Plantinga]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 3. Value of Knowledge
20219 True opinions only become really valuable when they are tied down by reasons [Plato]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / b. Recollection doctrine
5985 Seeking and learning are just recollection [Plato]
5986 The slave boy learns geometry from questioning, not teaching, so it is recollection [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
1923 As a guide to action, true opinion is as good as knowledge [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
1919 You don't need to learn what you know, and how do you seek for what you don't know? [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / d. Teaching virtue
1927 It seems that virtue is neither natural nor taught, but is a divine gift [Plato]
1913 Is virtue taught, or achieved by practice, or a natural aptitude, or what? [Plato]
1921 If virtue is a type of knowledge then it ought to be taught [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / j. Unity of virtue
1916 Even if virtues are many and various, they must have something in common to make them virtues [Plato]
1918 How can you know part of virtue without knowing the whole? [Plato]