64 ideas
354 | Wisdom makes virtue and true goodness possible [Plato] |
370 | Philosophy is a purification of the soul ready for the afterlife [Plato] |
2474 | It seems likely that analysis of concepts is impossible, but justification can survive without it [Fodor] |
2481 | Despite all the efforts of philosophers, nothing can ever be reduced to anything [Fodor] |
350 | In investigation the body leads us astray, but the soul gets a clear view of the facts [Plato] |
362 | The greatest misfortune for a person is to develop a dislike for argument [Plato] |
2505 | Turing invented the idea of mechanical rationality (just based on syntax) [Fodor] |
2470 | Transcendental arguments move from knowing Q to knowing P because it depends on Q [Fodor] |
10053 | Geometrical axioms imply the propositions, but the former may not be true [Russell] |
13155 | If you add one to one, which one becomes two, or do they both become two? [Plato] |
10052 | Geometry is united by the intuitive axioms of projective geometry [Russell, by Musgrave] |
21347 | If Simmias is taller than Socrates, that isn't a feature that is just in Simmias [Plato] |
2469 | The world is full of messy small things producing stable large-scale properties (e.g. mountains) [Fodor] |
360 | We must have a prior knowledge of equality, if we see 'equal' things and realise they fall short of it [Plato] |
1 | There is only one source for all beauty [Plato] |
368 | Other things are named after the Forms because they participate in them [Plato] |
2475 | Don't define something by a good instance of it; a good example is a special case of the ordinary example [Fodor] |
16516 | The ship which Theseus took to Crete is now sent to Delos crowned with flowers [Plato] |
2502 | How do you count beliefs? [Fodor] |
2501 | Berkeley seems to have mistakenly thought that chairs are the same as after-images [Fodor] |
357 | People are obviously recollecting when they react to a geometrical diagram [Plato] |
359 | If we feel the inadequacy of a resemblance, we must recollect the original [Plato] |
9343 | To achieve pure knowledge, we must get rid of the body and contemplate things with the soul [Plato] |
2465 | Maybe explaining the mechanics of perception will explain the concepts involved [Fodor] |
2504 | Rationalism can be based on an evolved computational brain with innate structure [Fodor] |
2493 | According to empiricists abstraction is the fundamental mental process [Fodor] |
2494 | Rationalists say there is more to a concept than the experience that prompts it [Fodor] |
15859 | To investigate the causes of things, study what is best for them [Plato] |
2503 | Empirical approaches see mind connections as mirrors/maps of reality [Fodor] |
2508 | The function of a mind is obvious [Fodor] |
13154 | Do we think and experience with blood, air or fire, or could it be our brain? [Plato] |
2485 | Do intentional states explain our behaviour? [Fodor] |
2506 | If I have a set of mental modules, someone had better be in charge of them! [Fodor] |
364 | One soul can't be more or less of a soul than another [Plato] |
2467 | Functionalists see pains as properties involving relations and causation [Fodor] |
2489 | Why bother with neurons? You don't explain bird flight by examining feathers [Fodor] |
2468 | Type physicalism is a stronger claim than token physicalism [Fodor] |
2490 | Modern connectionism is just Hume's theory of the 'association' of 'ideas' [Fodor] |
2476 | The goal of thought is to understand the world, not instantly sort it into conceptual categories [Fodor] |
2499 | Modules analyse stimuli, they don't tell you what to do [Fodor] |
2496 | Blindness doesn't destroy spatial concepts [Fodor] |
2497 | Something must take an overview of the modules [Fodor] |
2509 | Modules have in-built specialist information [Fodor] |
2491 | Modules have encapsulation, inaccessibility, private concepts, innateness [Fodor] |
2495 | Obvious modules are language and commonsense explanation [Fodor] |
2498 | Modules make the world manageable [Fodor] |
2500 | Babies talk in consistent patterns [Fodor] |
2507 | Rationality rises above modules [Fodor] |
2483 | Mentalese doesn't require a theory of meaning [Fodor] |
2480 | Language is ambiguous, but thought isn't [Fodor] |
2487 | Mentalese may also incorporate some natural language [Fodor] |
2486 | Content can't be causal role, because causal role is decided by content [Fodor] |
2492 | Experience can't explain itself; the concepts needed must originate outside experience [Fodor] |
2471 | Are concepts best seen as capacities? [Fodor] |
2472 | For Pragmatists having a concept means being able to do something [Fodor] |
2482 | It seems unlikely that meaning can be reduced to communicative intentions, or any mental states [Fodor] |
2477 | If to understand "fish" you must know facts about them, where does that end? [Fodor] |
2473 | Analysis is impossible without the analytic/synthetic distinction [Fodor] |
2484 | The theory of the content of thought as 'Mentalese' explains why the Private Language Argument doesn't work [Fodor] |
361 | It is a mistake to think that the most violent pleasure or pain is therefore the truest reality [Plato] |
351 | War aims at the acquisition of wealth, because we are enslaved to the body [Plato] |
13156 | Fancy being unable to distinguish a cause from its necessary background conditions! [Plato] |
369 | If the Earth is spherical and in the centre, it is kept in place by universal symmetry, not by force [Plato] |
363 | Whether the soul pre-exists our body depends on whether it contains the ultimate standard of reality [Plato] |